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Toward the Non-Expression of Feelings Themselves
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ABSTRACT
This essay accompanies the researcher’s Master of Fine Arts thesis
concert, Sensaciones y emociones (performed on September 5 and 6, 2017). It
describes how he employed his training as a flamenco dancer to
choreographically model three non-expressive interactions with three discrete
feelings in the performances of this concert. The essay outlines the ways in
which the researcher used his art practice to imagine alternative strategies for
relating to emotions and sensations, as phenomena that might put a body in
motion, but that do not always or necessarily travel from inside of a feeling
subject, outward, in an act commonly called expression.
Additionally, this essay draws attention to the ideological character of the
notions of self-expression and the notion of the dance form. It offers that these
ideas can work in tandem in dance discourse, describing the role of emotion in
shaping both concepts. Furthermore, it argues that each dancing body presents
a specific physicality as it moves, which choreographically models an attitude
toward emotion, as that body itself performs a practiced management of feeling.

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................iii
Abstract......................................................................................................................... iv
Introduction.....................................................................................................................1
Non-Expressivity: Sensation, Emotion, Affect................................................................7
Dance the Self-Expressive Practice: The Dance Form, the Body, and Ideology..........36
A History: Postmodern Dance and Feelings Themselves.............................................57
A History: Flamenco, Passionate Feeling, and Extra-Expression.................................72
Conclusion.....................................................................................................................93
Appendix A: Program, Sensaciones y emociones.........................................................97
Appendix B: Poster, Sensaciones y emociones ...........................................................99
References...................................................................................................................100

!

1
Introduction
One way to introduce this project might be to simply (finally) name what it

is. On September 5 and 6, 2017, I presented my Master of Fine Arts thesis
concert––Sensaciones y emociones––in a 100-seat, black-box performance
space in the University of New Mexico’s Center for the Arts, Albuquerque, New
Mexico. This evening-length flamenco choreography included Vicente Griego al
cante (song), Mario Febres and Ricardo Anglada al toque (guitar), and my father
and aunt––Joaquin Encinias and Marisol Encinias––as invited dance artists. One
section of the concert also included a special collaboration with video artist
Brian Fejer, who montaged my family’s home video footage from the 1960s into
a projection that I danced in front of, barefoot. I have included the concert’s
program and poster in this document as appendices. Sensaciones y emociones
was my first evening-length choreography in my career as a flamenco
performer.
This essay accompanies and accounts for that final choreographic
project, seeking to “identify and analyze specific artistic and choreographic
issues of particular concern to [me], and of particular relevance to [my] Project”
(Graduate Student Handbook 22). Given this assignment and the training I have
received in this program, I approach the total project––both the choreographic
work and this dissertation––as practice-as-research (or PaR). My understanding
of PaR is most influenced by theater studies scholar Robin Nelson’s Practice as
Research in the Arts: Principles, Protocols, Pedagogies, Resistances (2013). In it,
Nelson writes: “PaR involves a research project in which practice is a key
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method of inquiry and where, in respect of the arts, a practice […] is submitted
as substantial evidence of a research inquiry” (8–9). In a project of this nature, a
practitioner-researcher employs her own arts practice as method and as
evidence, with the explicit goal of producing knowledge through inquiry-driven
research. Here, I see discrete art works taking on a specific role in the formation
of knowledge, and by extension, are then are no longer chiefly valued as the
end-product of an art-making process. This dissertation will thereby further the
work I did in Sensaciones y emociones, in which my practice as a flamenco
performer: 1) became a means of researching an inquiry; and 2) created an
artistic product that can now function as analyzable evidence of that research.
The initial inquiry addressed questions that have come up for me
throughout my training as a dancer, centered around the notion of selfexpression. These initial research questions were: as a dancer, how might I
newly understand the idea and embodied experience of self-expression? What
are the consequences of naming dance an expressive practice? And more
generally, what is the role of one’s feelings in shaping dance works––as they are
crafted, performed, experienced, and discussed?
For me, Sensaciones y emociones was––in essence––a choreographic
and physicalized investigation into the relationship between a dance and three
particular feelings. Therefore, this dissertation aims to describe the ways in
which I used my training as a flamenco dancer to choreographically model three
non-expressive interactions with three discrete feelings in performance. To do
so, I collect and discuss the theories and definitions of emotion, sensation, and
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affect that I found most useful as I re-imagined self-expression for myself as a
dance-maker in the contemporary Western concert dance paradigm. I also
outline how I employed my art practice to research alternative ways of relating
to emotions and sensations, as phenomena that might put a body in motion, but
that do not always or necessarily travel from inside of a feeling subject, outward,
in an act often called expression.
In that it primarily seeks to document a process of practical
experimentation, I sense that this dissertation avoids direct argumentation.
However, I will foreground here what I consider to be the two central,
argumentative thrusts of this essay. First, I arrive at a description and definition
of my notion of non-expression on page 31, in which I detail how I worked to
physically perform an interaction with my feelings in Sensaciones y emociones,
as opposed to express them onstage through movement as a medium. Second,
on page 52, I argue that “each dancing body presents a physicality as it moves,
which choreographically models an attitude toward emotion, as [that] body itself
performs a practiced management of feeling.” I extend this logic on the
following page, offering a way of thinking about the dance form––the
mechanism by which we commonly segregate dancing bodies into generic
categories in dance discourse, criticism, and pedagogy. On this, I write:
I would also note that the diversity of physical practices within dance
creates an equally wide range of conceptions of one’s body, of
organizational protocols, and of course, of emotional management styles.
Each [dance] form [thereby] works to produce distinctive knowledges and
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cultures through these very conceptions, protocols, and styles. This
happens through physicalized practice and discourse over time––by way
of a body itself. Dance forms become like a body in this process,
acquiring a specific set of cultural knowledge through physical practice––
instruction on how to use, as well as how to feel, that very body. (Encinias
53)
As such, this essay draws attention to the ideological character of the notions of
self-expression and the dance form, noticing the ways in which they can work in
tandem, and by noticing the role of emotion in shaping both concepts.
Specifically, the notion of self-expression and the notion of the dance form
together give legibility to what can often be difficult to watch and describe––
movement and feeling. In seeking to trouble, complicate, or even queer these
standard ways of perceiving and discussing dance, this essay imagines
alternative practices for performers of movement and feeling. The essay also
suggests the ways in which bodies take the shape of feelings themselves, and
that in watching dance, the movement of feelings might be perceived, in turn.
The essay has four chapters. In the first chapter, I survey the literature
from affect theory and other research on emotion that I found relevant to my
work in Sensaciones y emociones, in order to define non-expressivity. In the
second chapter, I discuss the consequences of regarding dance an expressive
practice. In the third chapter, I locate my practice in a lineage of postmodern
dance-makers. In the fourth chapter, I employ the concepts I delineate in the
rest of the essay to look at some documents from flamenco history, while
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introducing myself as a flamenco practitioner and briefly describing the work
that I staged in Sensaciones y emociones.
I see now that this essay has certain stylistic and tonal characteristics
that are worth addressing outright. As literary studies scholar Sianne Ngai offers:
“to speak of tone is to generalize, totalize, and abstract the ‘world’ of the literary
object, in a way that seems particularly conducive to the analysis of ideology”
(43). Certainly, this essay is not a literary object. I do work throughout the essay,
however, to honestly portray the world of feeling from which Sensaciones y
emociones originated for me––just as I work to analyze ideology––and this joint
effort has an effect on the tone of the writing. I often write candidly, even
casually, to create a feeling of intimacy as I talk about my own, challenging
feelings. The essay is littered with italics; I work here to emphatically produce
accented rhythm as I write, just as I do when I dance flamenco––stressing what I
feel must be stressed, shouting when necessary, making sound. Reading it now,
the prose frequently strikes me as performative, but without being the
performance to which it refers. It is argumentative, but not quite in the ways I
was taught to make an argument. I see that it sometimes borders on being
irreverent or anti-academic, and that it even culminates into full-blown lyricism––
after over eighty pages of analytical work against expression. Tonally and
stylistically, this essay is a bit all over the place. However, I also hope that it
makes clear that these choices were not careless or arbitrary, but instrumental
to its central, persuasive effort.
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On this, Nelson––who supervises practice-as-research PhD candidates
as they dissertate––writes:
There is a sense of improvisation, indeed playfulness, in much studio
practice even where the research is most rigorous. It thus seems even
more ridiculous to be formal about an informal process and, in my
experience, first-person accounts of process often read well. It may even
be that more gestural poetic modes of expression are useful in this
aspect of the complementary writing in the attempt to articulate in words
what is ultimately better danced. (Nelson 35)
This piece of writing, which complements my rigorous and playful studio
practice, therefore articulates a formal research inquiry, but relies on a range of
informal style choices to give the writing its very character. My hope is that you,
the reader, do not become so distracted by the text’s tonal attitude that you
cannot follow the argument. However, after I walk away from a dance
performance, it is often that work’s very vibe, feel, or tone that I recall most
readily. For this reason, I worked to craft a vibe as I wrote, just as I do when I
dance.
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Chapter One
Non-expressivity: emotion, sensation, affect
This project began with two feelings––two feelings that eventually
became three dances. I will admit that they were:
1) a desire to feel better; and
2) a conviction that my feelings are hard to talk about.
I struggle now to imagine two sentiments more embarrassing or unremarkable.
Regardless, this humble confession of personal feelings––I will call it an
expression––points us to the central problematic of this essay: the notion that
emotions are something we express.
On this topic, I wonder: aren’t desires and convictions more than just
feelings? If so, at what point does a feeling become other than or more than just
a feeling? Why even call these feelings? Both seem to be feelings about
feelings, or not feelings themselves. Do feelings become other feelings in a literal
sense? Or is such a process instead figurative––a matter of how we imagine or
speak about the life of feelings? And then, what is it to feel better? Is it to
change what one is feeling or to change how one feels? In general, how do we
commonly talk about feelings? How does this notion of expression fit in?
In this chapter, I flesh out a vocabulary for speaking about feelings, and
the related concepts of emotion, sensation, affect, as well as expression, selfexpression, and finally, non-expression. I do so in order to later detail how these
two particular feelings of mine became three––that is, to articulate a process
through which feelings changed or expanded––a process that I used my dance
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practice to encourage, and that resulted in the three dances I performed in
Sensaciones y emociones.
Further, I also develop this vocabulary to consider how we talk about
feelings in the field of dance, where the role and status of emotion, I will
suggest, have been pivotal in a number of key debates in the discipline, and
therefore, have had direct consequence on how dancers dance and make
dance. Bear in mind throughout that my work here is primarily preoccupied with
the standard notion that dancers express themselves, and that in dance,
movement of one’s body is the medium of this expression––a means by which
we come to know the feelings of another––in the same way that language is
often used to express feelings. I will directly take up the concepts of dance,
dance forms, movement, and the body in the next section of this essay. Before I
move in that direction, and before I flesh out a vocabulary of concepts from
thinkers in other fields, I would like to clarify the intentions of this project.
I am not proposing an alternative conceptual model of emotions of my
own, derived from my experiences as a dancer. I am also not working in defense
of dance itself––that dancers might have privileged knowledge when it comes to
matters of feeling. Nor do I favor any one theorist’s definition(s) of emotion over
any other theorist’s definitions. Rather, I am documenting a process of practical
experimentation, by which I worked toward the possibility of feeling anew. I
began with an intuition that alternative ways of feeling––that is, talking about
feeling, feeling per se, and the somehow related practice of dancing––existed. I
reached a point in my practice as a dancer where I felt the need to feel
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differently; my body had hardened around old habits of feeling, and dancing
itself had become burdensome. I sensed that somehow feeling differently would
change how I move and perform, and so I began researching outside of my own
practice, but using that very practice to process the information I found, in turn.
In this practice-as-research endeavor, therefore, I find that the various theories
of emotion considered in this essay are not in contest with each other for me.
Rather, they together point to non-normative ways of conceiving of myself
emotionally. From the outset, I held that this conceptual path must be debated,
and its theories tested, by theorists and artists alike. That is, I felt that a range of
methods of debating and testing theories must be conjointly practiced if we are
to move beyond conversations about emotion and expressivity that are ipso
facto conversations about mind-body dualism––conversations contingent on
hierarchically designed ideas with problematic histories, conversations
conducted solely in language.
Secondly, the conceptual framework I am about to construct is built upon
feminist efforts and is itself a feminist effort. Throughout, I will consider the work
of scholars who have crucially noted that a philosophical preoccupation with
emotion was not new or unique to feminism, and far less so to the more recent,
so-called “affective turn” (see Ahmed, Pinch, and Terada). Regardless, it was
explicitly feminist and queer scholarship that attended to, as the cultural theorist
Sara Ahmed phrases it, “how emotions can attach us to the very conditions of
our subordination” (12). To state it crassly, as is often done: a feeling subject is a
weaker subject, a more feminine subject, a woman or else a pussy; a man is
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driven by reason, emotion’s dialectic opposite, and is therefore more deserving
of political power. And indeed, even if feminism was not the first intellectual
tradition to problematize the opposition of emotion and reason, the movement’s
battle cry––the personal is political––impassioned many feminists to take their
own feelings seriously, and not only in the modes of philosophical and artistic
inquiry. To proclaim, as Ahmed summarizes, that “emotions ‘matter’ for politics”
is to assert that a woman’s expression of her feelings is not an inevitable force
of nature to which she is powerless––a leakage from her private subjectivity––
but rather, is the very stuff of the public sphere, is an act that is world-making
and political, that uniquely empowers her as political subject (12). In this project,
I have taken my own feelings quite seriously. I believe this renders the project an
aesthetic investigation, a personal journey, and a political act. In an effort to
attend specifically to the political dimension of this work, I became interested in
the relationship between one’s emotions and one’s status as a so-called
subject––that is, the possibility that by feeling, a human is an individual, a
person, or a discrete “I.” This curiosity was my point of entry into the literature I
will review.
To frame this effort differently: the notion of the personal is political has
been articulated by the feminist Cherríe Moraga in the following manner.
What brought me to feminism almost forty years ago was ‘heart.’
Feminism allowed ‘heart’ to matter. It acknowledged that the oppression
we experienced as human beings was not always materially manifested,
and that we also suffered spiritually and sexually. Women of color have
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traditionally served as the gateways––the knowledge-holders––to those
profoundly silent areas of expression and oppression: domestic abuse
aggravated by poverty, patriarchal strictures that distort the ‘spirit’ of
religious practice; false familial hierarchies that deform our children’s
potential; erotic desire deadened by duty.
Such suffering is experienced by both males and females (not
proportionately, but mutually). (Moraga xxi)
Here, Moraga relies on the notion of one’s heart to name something that we
commonly employ figurative language to symbolize. In this work, I am invested
precisely in these hard-to-name phenomena that are “not always materially
manifested” and in “those profoundly silent areas of expression and oppression”
that nevertheless enter our cultural, artistic, and discursive imaginaries by
means of figurative language, expressive movement, other modes of
performance including the sexual and the spiritual, and on the opposite end of
the behavioral spectrum: through phenomena such as domestic violence and
institutional oppression (Moraga xxi). For me, this is the realm and the
importance of work on feelings. Theories aside, the notion of emotion is
attached to a specific range of cultural practices and conditions––lived realities
somehow imagined as not quite real, not quite a problem, or else, a problem for
women––things we don’t talk about or talk about only obliquely. This is
burdensome work and it can no longer be the responsibility of women of color
alone. And I fear that if conversations about feelings remain only theoretical,
only personal, or only artistic, these realities won’t be adequately addressed.
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Instead, I wonder how these realms of experience might be lived and practiced
conjointly. What if my artistic practice is itself a theoretical response to
alternative conceptual models of emotion? What if I take my feelings––ugly,
personal, embarrassing, unremarkable––quite seriously?
This matter of the heart––an organ––conceived of as a place, and
furthermore, as a place to feel from and move from will be considered later in
the essay. Until then, I turn to feelings themselves in a theoretical light, agreeing
with artist Naomi Littlebear Morena that “my emotions & intuitions are there for a
reason. They are honest perceptions” (156).
***
Working in dance––a field with its own internal debates about emotion––I
will draw selectively from the literature now loosely called affect theory.
Considered by many to be a fundamental human characteristic, feeling has
inspired extensive inquiry across the sciences and humanities––inquiry that has
led to seemingly very little consensus. But here is an example of affect theory at
work. It is useful in that it points directly to the theoretical practice of
occasionally naming emotion affect.
Theorist Brian Massumi begins Parables for the Virtual––a key text in
affect theory––by pointing to feeling as an intrinsic feature of the human body.
He writes: “When I think of my body and ask what it does to earn that name, two
things stand out. It moves. It feels. In fact, it does both at the same time. Can we
think a body without this: an intrinsic connection between movement and
sensation whereby each immediately summons the other?” (1). For Massumi, a
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body is not conceivable without its capacity to move and feel. Furthermore,
movement and sensation exist in yet another unmediated relationship; they do
not exist independently. His larger project is a complex work with far-reaching
implications, built around the following “conceptual displacement,” or
progression of ideas: “body–(movement/sensation)–change” (Massumi 1). He
offers that recent cultural theory has largely ignored the unmediated
relationships between the body, movement, and sensation. Instead, the
humanities have used the notion of culture to mediate bodies and change––or,
to stand between and account for the changes bodies experience over time.
History has consisted of body–culture–change narratives, as culture has
consisted of various “mechanisms of ‘mediation’” or “ideological apparatuses
that structured the dumb material interaction of things [i.e., bodies] and
rendered them legible according to a dominant signifying scheme into which
human subjects in the making were ‘interpellated’” (Massumi 1). In doing so,
Massumi argues that the humanities have vastly misrepresented two of its
central concerns: the body and change. This work is affect theory par
excellence for its defense of the human capacity to feel––over the human
capacity to produce culture––in understanding human life, no matter one’s
methods or aims in understanding.
This is a gloss of classic work from affect theory, page one. My hope is
that you, the reader, also find it somewhat disorienting. Important to my work,
however:
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1) Feeling, when imagined as something with great conceptual weight––
an alternative to culture for example––is often called affect.
2) The notion of the human subject is a product of culture; culture is a
concept that, when it renders bodies legible as subjects, mediates.
For Massumi affect is more immediate to the body itself, and its ability
to feel as it moves.
In my project, I see expressive movement and self-expression as similar
mechanisms of mediation in the dance field. Here, a body is dancing if it is
expressing its feelings through movement. Just as the notion of culture renders
a body a human subject, the notion of expression through movement renders a
body a dancer, by way of interpellation (cf. Louis Althusser). I turn to affect
theory to gesture to a large body of research that wonders about bodies when
they are not interpellated as human subjects through cultural processes, by
noticing––via the notion of affect––that there is an unmediated relationship
between moving, feeling, and the body itself.
Affect theory of this character is built upon the work of philosophers such
as Baruch Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze––who took up the notion of affect
explicitly before it was an intellectual buzzword––and other canonical
philosophers who addressed emotion or the passions, such as Rene Descartes,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and David Hume. Affect theory has since been
bolstered by a range of psychoanalytic theories, while also developing as a
poststructuralist field of discourse; the scholar of postmodern English literature
Patrick Colm Hogan calls it “affective poststructuralism” (Colm Hogan). Quite
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broadly, this theory studies feeling, a human behavior that we seemingly
experience by way of both our bodies and our minds. As such, philosophical
debates about mind-body dualism and causality have been conceptually
reinvigorated by the notion of affect, as announced by the literary theorist
Michael Hardt (ix). Through scholars such as Massumi, the concept has played
a role in recent cultural theory, and as I suggested earlier, the feminist
intellectual tradition has encouraged many theorists to rely on the notion of
affect in explicitly political and queer discourse.
This scholarly interest in affect is distinct from recent, related work on
feelings, coming from academic disciplines as diverse as cognitive science,
anthropology, literary studies, and history. To summarize the difference and to
position myself, I notice that very few people refer to their own feelings (whether
of sadness, of existential dread, or of midday bloatedness) in everyday speech
as their “affects.” Consider the definition of affect offered by editors Melissa
Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth in their introduction to The Affect Theory
Reader: affect is “an impingement or extrusion of a momentary or sometimes
more sustained state of relation as well as the passage (and the duration of
passage) of forces or intensities” (1). They continue: “at its most
anthropomorphic, affect is the name we give to those forces beneath, alongside,
or generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond
emotion” and “that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and
extension, and can likewise suspend us […]” (Gregg and Seigworth 1). Affect is
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often conceived as more like a force than a feeling; somehow, it is “beyond
emotion” (Gregg and Seigworth 1).
On the other hand, many scholars choose to consider emotion and not
move beyond it, often for political reasons. Ahmed writes: “Feminist ears might
prick up at this point. A contrast between a mobile impersonal affect and a
contained personal emotion suggests that the affect/emotion distinction can
operate as a gendered distinction,” just as reason/passion has long operated as
a gendered distinction (207). Given my own investments in work on feelings, I
align myself with those that have “understood [the affective turn] as a turn away
from emotion” (Ahmed 206). I see it as a turn away from those historically
regarded as emotional, and away from the ways we talk about feelings in daily
life and in dance praxis. Similarly, affect theory is often criticized for a somewhat
willful disregard of the related field of affective science––study of emotion in
social psychology and the cognitive sciences (Hogan). As will become more and
more clear throughout this essay, there are numerous ways in which affect is
seen as distinct from and even conceptually superior to emotion. This has
certain consequences, which I will discuss in the coming pages.
But despite these consequences, Colm Hogan and Rachel Greenwald
Smith––also a scholar of postmodern English literature––both consider the role
of affect theory in recent literary studies debates and arrive at similar
conclusions. Smith writes: “the affective turn […] can instead be understood to
provide tools for a better understanding of how postmodernist aesthetic
strategies in contemporary fiction complicate the relationship between feeling
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and the individual; embodiment and subjectivity” (424). Ahmed summarizes her
stance similarly, even as she disassociates her work from the affective turn:
In The Cultural Politics of Emotion, I hoped to develop a model of emotion
that involves subjects but is not reducible to them; […] I wanted to show
how emotions are not transparent; so much follows when we do not
assume we always know how we feel, and that feelings do not belong or
even originate with an ‘I’, and only then move out toward others. (208)
A model of emotions that is not reducible to subjects––or that complicates the
idea that feeling stems from discrete individuals––reflects trends in affect theory,
or perhaps, uses its tools. Affect is frequently defined as feeling without or
before a human subject, and is thus associated with preceding poststructuralist
critiques of subjectivity, largely driven by white men, as opposed to being
associated with feminist scholarship, despite that work’s ongoing investigation
of bodies and emotions as political concepts. While theorists like Brian Massumi
maintain a sharp distinction between emotion and affect, other scholars such as
Sara Ahmed, Sianne Ngai, and Rei Terada stay away from the concept of affect
proper, even in taking up similar ideas. Affect may figure prominently in their
intellectual preoccupations with feelings, but the concept is typically discussed
precisely in terms of its evading attachment to the so-called human subject.
It helps to fully register how affect and emotion are often differentiated
along these lines. Sianne Ngai is a literary studies scholar who summarizes the
history of the affect/emotion split, with reference to Massumi. She notes that the
two terms were first employed by psychoanalysts to differentiate in practice
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between an analyst’s observation of feelings (called affect) as opposed to the
patient’s own emotions, as described by the patient himself (25). This is a
difference between “third-person and first-person representations of feeling”
that, through various theoretical efforts, eventually became the notion that
“emotion requires a subject while affect does not” (Ngai 25). I think that the
psychoanalyst–analysand relationship gives a tangible image to what can be
quite confusing, seeing as it is very common to conceive of feeling as always
belonging to a person in whom it originates. So-called real feelings, described
by a patient from the couch, are no less real once transcribed word-for-word on
the analyst’s note pad, but they certainly can be considered feelings in another
form or state––a psychoanalyst has a different relationship with the word “sad”
than her patient does. As the analyst begins a spoken analysis of the
emotions/affects she has just transcribed, the feelings continue in a process of
change or differentiation. The difference is not that the analyst’s notes are a
representation of the feelings, while the patient’s spoken description counts as
the feelings themselves. Both are representations of feeling in language. Ngai
thus characterizes this differentiation using one of Massumi’s own words for
affect––intensity. In Ngai’s work on what she calls ugly feelings:
the difference [between emotion and affect] is taken as a modal
difference of intensity or degree, rather than a formal difference of quality
or kind. My assumption is that affects are less formed and structured than
emotions, but not lacking form or structure altogether; less
“sociolinguistically fixed,” but by no means code-free or meaningless;
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less organized in response to our interpretations of situations, but by no
means entirely devoid of organization or diagnostic powers. (Ngai 27)
This is a useful, nuanced deployment of Massumi’s own definition(s) of emotion
as narrative in nature, or as a “sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an
experience which is from that point onward defined as personal” and as a
“qualified intensity; the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity
into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable
action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning” (28). Perhaps a dancer’s
words will clarify. In a performance workshop on dancers and authorship that I
attended in January of 2017, the dancer and pedagogue Chrysa Parkinson
described a difference between:
1) sadness; and
2) crossing paths with a hissing cat, hunching its back.
The second is no less recognizable for being more an affective experience than
an emotion per se, such as sadness. There is simply a difference, though both
have something to do with feeling.
The difference as maintained by most affect theorists is that affect is
emotion without an originating subject, and for precisely this reason, emotion
without associated sociolinguistic narratives and meaning––in other words,
affects are feeling-based experiences without names such as sadness, and
furthermore, feeling-based experiences somehow lacking a feeling “I.” I now
return to Massumi to examine his notion of subject-less feeling in Parables of
the Virtual.
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Part of Massumi’s issue with the idea of culture is that “ideological
accounts of subject formation emphasize systemic structuring” which gave birth
to the very concept of “positionality” ––a human subject’s location on a grid
“conceived as an oppositional framework of culturally constructed significations:
male versus female, black versus white, gay versus straight, and so on” (2). His
investment in the human capacity for movement stems in part from this
question, one that might resonate with many dancers and queer people: “How
does a body perform its way out of a definitional framework that […] seems to
prescript every possible signifying and countersignifying move as a selection
from a repertoire of possible permutations on a limited set of predetermined
conditions?” (3). As such, Massumi wonders about movement of a body as
“qualitative transformation” as opposed to a subject’s displacement on the grid,
which would be those rare moments of success in occupying a new subject
position (3). He holds, as many dancers might, that “when a body is in motion, it
does not coincide with itself. It coincides with its own transition: its own
variation” (Massumi 4). For me, dance has often provided a similar escape from
the feeling of being myself; through movement, I sense that I can perform a
transcendence of my own societally prescribed identity. Massumi criticizes
cultural theory along quite similar lines, offering that its usual ways of thinking
about human subjects creates troublesome stasis or cultural “gridlock,” largely
due to insufficient vocabulary for accounting for human movement (3).
Remember that for Massumi, feeling is a direct consequence of moving––
I move, I feel. His notion of affect as feeling-without-subject thus begins with the
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notion of movement, and continues in his discussion of sensations. If a body in
motion “does not coincide with itself,” then “sensation is never simple” either
(Massumi 3; Massumi 13). He writes: “[Sensation] is always doubled by the
feeling of having a feeling. […] It is an immediate self-complication. It is best to
think of it as a resonation, or interference pattern” (14). He describes how an
echo––sound bouncing back and forth in the distance between two surfaces––is
not reducible to either surface, nor the initial sound itself. Rather, it is the
multiplication of sound created by an interference pattern; the sound wave
intersects with itself as it bounces from wall to wall, creating an echo. Much in
the way we understand the inseparability of a dancer and a dance, “that
patterning is not at a distance from itself. It is immediately its own event”
(Massumi 14). It positively fills space with itself, and in doing so, re-encounters
and interferes with itself in a continuity that is dance-like; Massumi writes “this
complex self-continuity is a putting into relation of the movement to itself: selfrelation” (14). Our devoted study of the dynamics of this unique scenario often
gives dancers the reputation of being narcissistic.
When I imagine the life of a feeling in these terms, the notion of a feeling
of having a feeling suddenly makes sense. A feeling feels more intense to me the
more it bounces around inside me; the stronger the initial shout of a feeling, the
more I experience it bouncing against my very edges, then interfering with itself
and echoing, multiplying into more and more feeling as it resonates. Eventually
the feeling dissipates, or another shout is shouted. But the echoing produces
both a feeling and a dizzying feeling of having that feeling, as it continually self-
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relates and multiplies. No wonder we’re always trying to get feelings out of us;
this experience, contained internally, is often quite intense.
Massumi claims that “the best word for a complicating immediacy of selfrelation is ‘intensity’” and that “with the body, the ‘walls’ are the sensory
surfaces. The intensity is the experience. […] The conversion of surface distance
into intensity is also the conversion of the materiality of the body into an event”
(Massumi 14). Common representations of the body and the mind as distinct
containers of interiority thus make great sense. I experience thinking and feeling
as events as they intensely fill the spaces I imagine inside of me. So much is
going on in there! But crucially, Massumi holds that “This is not yet a subject.
But it may well be the conditions of emergence of a subject: an incipient
subjectivity. Call it a ‘self-’” (14). In other words, “I” have not yet done anything
in this scenario, even as experience gradually gives me an increasing sense of
my me-ness. I suppose it wouldn’t be until I shouted back into myself––
intentionally creating more resonant thought and feeling––that I would begin to
register myself as a subject or an agent.
I understand this self-reflexive shout-back to be what Massumi calls
“emotional qualification” ––wherein this inner resonance of sensation is finally
named in emotional terms (26). He writes: “the qualification of an emotion is
quite often […] itself a narrative element that moves the action ahead, taking its
place in socially recognized lines of action and reaction” (Massumi 26). Only a
certain number of emotional concepts are in social and linguistic circulation;
they come inflected with histories, and as such, narrative content and

23
associated courses of action. That is, we do certain things when sad. Affect
theorists such as Massumi note that these histories, narratives, and action
circuits necessarily implicate the human subject (“I feel sad”) and they differ
entirely in nature from the “irreducibly bodily and autonomic nature of affect”
(Massumi 28).
Taking this concept further, the historian William Reddy summarizes
recent work on emotions in cognitive psychology, saying “the learning of what
we conventionally call emotions must involve both deep goal relevance and
mental control” (32). Citing the psychologists A. M. Isen and G. A. Diamond,
who view emotions as overlearned cognitive habits, Reddy here notices a
related trend in an affective science, wherein an emotion is a learned act of
cognitive labor that is intentional, self-regulatory, and driven by social motives.
That is, this labor involves people, intentionally shaping how they hope to be
experienced as a person by others––an effortful act of translation, from feeling to
being and doing. Reddy works here specifically to imagine emotional regimes,
which “would be essential elements of stable political regimes” in which
subjects feel in line with the values of the regime (55). I will discuss this
argument of Reddy’s later in the essay. Regardless, his work suggests that the
sudden jump from in to out––from feeling affect to then naming and living it as
an emotion––positions a feeling body in culture and history. That body is now a
subject.
Understanding the ways in which emotions circulate socially and create
political subjects is Ahmed’s project in The Cultural Politics of Emotion. I
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previously described Ahmed’s distrust of the independent concept of affect as a
feminist conviction. However, her distrust also stems from recognizing that this
felt journey from affect to emotion is lived as “contiguous,” likening the act of
separating the two to separating an egg yolk from its white:
We can separate different parts of a thing even if they are contiguous,
even if they are, as it were, in a sticky relation. We might have different
methods for performing the action of separation. But we have to separate
the yolk from the white because they are not separate. And sometimes
we “do do” what we “can do” because separating those elements, not
only by treating them as separable but by modifying their existing
relation, or how they exist in relation, allows us to do other things that we
might not otherwise be able to do. That we can separate them does not
mean they are separate. Given that it was the contiguity between different
aspects of experience (sensation, thought, feeling, judgement), how they
stick together that I was trying to explore, without assuming the subject
as the origin of this coherence, it did not make sense to proceed by
separating affect from emotion. I recognize, however, that there are other
ways of proceeding. (Ahmed 210)
I fully agree with Ahmed, but I also recognize that I am perhaps taking one such
other way of proceeding. Unlike Massumi, I do not strictly maintain that affect
and emotion “pertain to different orders” (27). In this project though, I am trying
to do something with feelings as a dancer that I might not otherwise be able to
do, until I am able to imagine my feelings as not belonging to me, or mine only in
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those moments that I claim them. Furthermore, I am working with feelings that I
do not want to give emotional names; they are hard to talk about. In line with
Ahmed, I do not see this as expressing affect as opposed to emotion, but rather,
as not expressing myself at all. When I surrender or willfully ignore my own
status as subject––or deny myself as the origin of all the feeling I am
experiencing––I am no longer a self per se, confessing feeling and thereby
expressing. As a dancer, I want to feel better by feeling in a new way. This is not
dance without feeling, but experiencing feeling as not always originating in me.
My questions are: to what extent is this possible, legible to others through
performance, and ethical? I wonder who before me has done similar work, and
furthermore, if doing this work changes who or what I am. If I am not expressing
myself, am I even still a dancer?
As attested by the choreographer Martha Graham: “I am a dancer. I
believe we learn by practice” (95). And, I am dancer; I often find myself looking
for a technique in order to effectively practice what I want to do. Ahmed was the
first theorist I encountered who provided me with tools for surrendering my
status as a subject, and I would be remiss not to list some of them here.
To begin simply, it was in the Cultural Politics of Emotion that I was first
introduced to the so-called “inside out,” psychological model of emotions
(Ahmed 8). Ahmed encourages the reader to “register what might seem too
obvious: the everyday language of emotion is based on the presumption of
interiority” (8). As we have seen, this logic extends into even the most theoretical
discourse on affect; Massumi likens affect to the “conversion of surface

26
distance into intensity” performed by echoing sound, bouncing between two
walls (14). The notion of expression is a direct consequence of this logic. Ahmed
writes on how feelings, imagined this way, became an object of study in
psychology: “Once what is inside has got out, when I have expressed my
feelings in this way, then my feelings also become yours, and you may respond
to them” (14). This metaphor relies on spatiality––from interior space, feeling
travels out into the world––to reify what cannot be seen. And regardless of the
particular emotion, it also gives a narrative arc to the life of a feeling, which
makes it easier to analyze. Of course, this is vastly over-simple. I have felt
feelings that behave differently: feelings that do not traverse space, feelings that
do begin in me, feelings that do not occasion expression. I assume that I am not
unique in witnessing the alternative behavior of even some of the most banal of
feelings: an itch, for example, is a feeling that does not often lead me to
expression. It does not begin somewhere within in me. It is a feeling regardless.
Along with subjects come objects, too. Another common way of thinking
about emotion complicated by Ahmed is that there is always an object of a
subject’s feeling: that which the feeling is about. In other words, if I am afraid,
there is something I am afraid of, and furthermore, it is because that thing is
scary. While Ahmed notes that critique of this model began as early as
Descartes, she summarizes it through an example of a child encountering a
bear. Bears are not inherently fearsome; bears are fearsome to humans: “So fear
is not in the child, let alone in the bear, but is a matter of how child and bear
come into contact. This contact is shaped by past histories, unavailable in the
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present, which allow the bear to be apprehended as fearsome” (Ahmed 7).
Certainly, a bear is scary to a small child; he does not need to have been told
about bears to experience fear. But for this scene to be named and
apprehended in emotional terms––we are talking about how we imagine fear
here, as we do not have access to this particular child’s feelings in real time––an
encounter is necessary, and in this moment of relation, a lot happens. Ahmed
writes: “emotions operate to ‘make’ and ‘shape’ bodies” (4). In other words, a
bear becomes fearsome in an instant, is shaped as an object to be feared by
humans, while the child is shaped as a subject––the subject that supposedly
feels the fear. In actuality, it is the fear did all of the work here.
Indeed, somewhat in line with Massumi’s affect-as-echo analogy,
Ahmed’s fuller claim is that “emotions shape the very surfaces of bodies, which
take shape through the repetition of actions over time, as well as through
orientations towards and away from others” (Ahmed 4). For me as a dancer, this
is intuitive and quite real. I see that my body has been shaped by my feelings; its
surfaces stretched and changed through years of feeling feelings. For others, it
may not be so straightforward. Ahmed reminds us how a body takes shape from
emotion in two ways:
1) “emotions create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that
allow us to distinguish an inside and an outside in the first place” and
2) “emotions are not ‘in’ the individual or the social, but produce the very
surfaces and boundaries that allow the individual and the social to be
delineated as if they are objects” (10).
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For example, Ahmed guided my attention to the fact that I notice my body
when it is in pain (24). I feel my stomach as distinct from my chest or my back
when that pain is a stomach ache, and I feel my insides as distinct from my
outsides when my skin breaks, or when I have a secret and I just need to get it
out. Surfaces, boundaries, and entities are produced by the very experience of
feeling. Ahmed brilliantly explains this idea not only in terms of individual bodies,
but also collective bodies (2). For example, the invasion of foreign others in a
country often increases nationalistic sentiment––the nation feels its body when
entered by another, and then often works to preserve or protect itself. It is
perhaps clearer here that, again, “feelings do not reside in subjects [i.e., the
nation] or objects [i.e., the foreign other], but are produced as effects of
circulation” (Ahmed 8). Ahmed’s main interests are social and political
structures; she characterizes this circulation of feeling as an “affective
economy” wherein what circulates are emotions as I’ve described them thus far.
Emotions can be seen as sociolinguistic narratives attached to emotional
objects (things that inspire feeling), past cultural histories of contact with these
objects, and commonly used figures of speech (metaphors, metonymies) used
to name and talk about these feelings, or to put them in circulation. The social
world is shaped as these figures circulate, in part because “the attribution of
feelings to an object (I feel afraid because you are fearsome) is an effect of the
encounter, which moves the subject away from [or toward] the object” (Ahmed
8). Feelings move bodies, literally and figuratively, and they orient and position
us, in turn. But also, “emotions are after all moving” (Ahmed 11).
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I can characterize this movement for myself as economic circulation, as
sound waves bouncing against surfaces, or as an eruption from my interior as I
express myself through dance. But no matter the imagined movement pattern or
origin, Ahmed pointed me to the movement of feelings in this world. I had
studied the movement of my body my entire life without quite noticing that my
feelings move, as well, and that my body has been affected by their movement. I
looked again at my body; I noticed that my chest––that place that holds my
feelings, sometimes called the breast or the heart––or more literally, the muscles
in that area, had hardened around a unidirectional movement path. The
overwhelming desire to express my feelings––to get them out of me––had
thrown my chest outward and upward, I think, and that is now where I hold it. I
have not had a dance teacher who has not in some way commented on this
holding pattern; in dance as in life, this posture of the body can pose problems.
We work to keep certain things contained; keep your ribcage closed. We want
the expression to look effortless; let it go; drop it. Alternatively, my chest
situation has been named a case of possessing too much courage, and a sign of
my training as a flamenco dancer––an expression of the pride and arrogance of
our dance. In every one of these cases, emotions are named as moving and
shaping me, and in each case, I am properly re-aligned: our feelings move from
inside out and as such, one must compensate accordingly if one is to express
well in our field. This is the work of a dancer with good alignment.
I do not intend to announce myself a victim of my own feelings here, to
whom I am indebted, nor of my dance teachers, to whom I am indebted. I only
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wish to explain how I came to understand that feelings move. In this process, I
also realized just how commonly we imagine that they move in only one
direction and from a singular point of origin. We can name this self-expression.
Affect theorists have worked to isolate feeling from the “self-”, and some have
gone so far as to alternatively characterize movement patterns, beyond the
notion of expression, such as Ahmed’s figure of circulation. This is where I am
intervening. Here are program notes from the September 5 and 6, 2017
performances of Sensaciones y emociones:
Sensaciones y emociones studies the role of emotion and sensation in
shaping a dance. In this performance, I wonder if my feelings exist mainly
in my thoughts, in my body, in the music I hear, or some combination of
those places. I wonder if feelings are free to travel in space and time on
their own somehow, and I wonder how I might help them to be free. I
wonder what is happening –– emotionally speaking –– when a body is
moved to dance.
I began this work by asking myself how I might newly understand the
idea and experience of self-expression, and then, by investigating other
directions and ways in which to move with feeling –– as a dancer, as a
performer, as a student of flamenco. […] (Encinias)
To study how feelings might move on their own and how that movement might
shape a dance, and to imagine their freedom, I identified three feelings of my
own––three feelings that at that time were pointing me to my very me-ness, my
subjectivity, or my person. I set them free by no longer imagining them as my
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own. I noticed how they behaved. Then, I began interacting with them––by
reinserting myself into their lives and manipulating them as material, just as a
choreographer works with dancers. Eventually, I choreographically modeled
their movement and made three corresponding dances. I will detail this work in
the final section of this essay. However, based on the thinking I’ve presented
thus far, I hope it makes some sense that I call the performances of these three
dances (as well as the creative effort behind each) non-expressions.
***
By way of conclusion, I’d like to qualify what I mean by setting feelings
free, or what it is to imagine their freedom. In her discussion of hate, Ahmed
writes: “my model of hate as an affective economy suggests that emotions do
not positively inhabit anybody or anything, meaning that ‘the subject’ is simply
one nodal point in the economy, rather than its origin and destination” (46). One
way to set feelings free, therefore, is to allow that they move in patterns of
circulation, wherein “I” am constitutive of the emotion only to a degree. “I” am
one place that a feeling visits as it travels. Particularly in performance, the
feelings I experience while dancing are shared with everyone in the room; the
feelings visit the audience, as well, coming into existence in large part through
their own perceptions of it.
Theatre studies scholar Erika Fischer-Lichte names this ongoing “bodily
co-presence” of performers and audience a central characteristic of
performance, and calls this exchange the “autopoietic feedback loop” (19; 20).
Notice that Fischer-Lichte names here a circulatory, looping pattern––wherein
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my performed feeling exists in large part because you are witnessing it. This
significantly diminishes my inclination to call it mine in the first place. I may feel
happy in this dance, but you are perceiving that I look angry; neither of us are
correct. The same feeling is simply affecting us differently, making it hard to
name. We might say that an emotion is free here in that it is intersubjective:
neither mine nor yours but ours, or else, no one’s.
Meanwhile, if performance sets an emotion free, so does recognizing, as
the political theorist Jane Bennett does, this related matter of it being an it. In
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Bennett notices “this habit of
parsing the world into dull matter (it, things) and vibrant life (us, beings)” (vii).
She offers that this separation “encourage[s] us to ignore the vitality of matter
and the lively powers of material formulations” –– that is, that non-living things
actually do a great deal in the world (Bennett vii). In possessing vitality, or in
acting “as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies”
and that often “impede or block the will and designs of humans,” things possess
something of a life of their own (Bennett viii). I grant emotions a certain freedom
when I fully recognize their autonomy and vitality.
Bennet’s work is explicitly political. She asks: “how would political
responses to public problems change were we to take seriously the vitality of
(nonhuman) bodies?” I can use this to model one of my own questions: how
would aesthetic responses to personal problems change were we to take
seriously the vitality of (nonhuman, or nonsubjective) feelings? Furthermore, I
wholly agree with Bennett that “what is needed is a cultivated, patient, sensory
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attentiveness to nonhuman forces operating outside and inside the human
body” as well as “a willingness to theorize events (a blackout, a meal, an
imprisonment in chains, an experience of litter) as encounters between
ontologically diverse actants, some human, some not, though all thoroughly
material” (xiv). Dance must be theorized as one such event, including selfidentifying expressive dance, in order to fully register how emotions can operate
in performance as vital entities. Further, I am fascinated by the possible
materiality of emotions themselves, as another such way to imagine their
freedom. As in the case of a potter working because of a deep reverence for
clay, the clay is no dumb, mute substance to the artisan but instead speaks to
her, encouraging her very creativity.
Alternatively, Bennett’s project draws attention to the rampant narcissism
of human ways of speaking, which in turn creates an illusion of our very control
over the material world (xvi). By extension, one reason for insisting that feelings
always come from a person is that, in fact, we often experience them as having
control over us. I will call this notion passion when I address flamenco and
consider its aesthetics and its history. But it is relevant to note here, as the
cultural theorist Rei Terada does, that “emotions are often portrayed as
expressions of a subject imposed upon the subject” –– as we do in describing
someone as involuntarily overcome by a feeling; for example, “when someone is
seized by remorse or surprised by joy” (5). By extension, Reddy’s work suggests
that much of the discussion of emotions as goal-relevant in the cognitive
sciences stems from a “folk wisdom of the West” that prescribes that we
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“master them or be mastered by them” (15). Reddy considers the work of
scientists employing laboratory techniques to observe cognitive effort in
emotional situations, such as the cognitive scientists R. M. Wenzlaff and D. E.
Bates, who note that “persons at risk of depression may be avoiding depression
by means of high levels of conscious thought suppression” (ctd. in Reddy 28). In
this work, Wenzlaff and Bates conclude that “full recovery [from depression]
may be more likely if individuals do not routinely rely on thought suppression to
avoid depressive thoughts” (ctd. in Reddy 28). I provide this to suggest the
rather autonomous character of many of our emotions, even as we experience
them inside our own heads. Emotions feel free when they operate
autonomously, such as when they require effort in order to master or control
them, or when they occasion observation and interpretation, or when they call
for something like surrender.
To conclude here, Rei Terada’s Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the Death
of the Subject is another remarkable project in this field of discourse, and I will
mention it again as I continue. She suggests the autonomy of emotion by
pointing to its significant role in poststructuralist critiques of subjectivity and
experience. But she also writes: “I have argued that while emotions are real
experiences, the expression that supposedly conveys them and the subject that
supposedly expresses them are angels parasitical on the phenomenon of
emotion; that, rather, the domain of emotion is at once interpretive and
nonsubjective” (Terada 118; my emphasis). In Sensaciones y emociones, I
strived to present the phenomenon of three emotions as directly as I could. I
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used myself and my training in self-expression as conservatively as possible, to
foreground the qualities of emotions set free, in their own domain. I will admit
that the presence of emotion in this form in performance, alongside a body in
quite close proximity, dancing nearby, does give off a very strong appearance of
self-expression. But I insist here that it is only an appearance––an apparition or
an angel.

36
Chapter Two
Dance the self-expressive practice: the dance form, the body, and ideology
In this chapter, I will consider two works from dance studies––Dance and
the Lived Body: A Descriptive Aesthetics by Sondra Horton Fraleigh and
Choreographing Empathy: Kinesthesia in Performance by Susan Leigh Foster––
to trace a way of thinking about the dance form. I will arrive there by continuing
to look closely at the notion of the self-expressive body, ultimately likening the
concept of the dance form to a body itself. This will be helpful in recognizing the
emotional tendencies of bodies who perform, or are expressive of, the traditions
of modern dance, postmodern dance, and flamenco. My intentions in the next
section of this essay are to position my work in a lineage, and I am interested in
how these three dance traditions––with regards to feeling specifically––have
come to be seen as different practices, genres, or forms. This will be another
instance of feelings themselves giving shape to or bringing a body into
existence, or at least, legibility.
The widespread practice in our field of marking a dancer’s identity with
reference to the category of a dance form (for example, she was a ballet dancer
but now she is a modern dancer) is very related to what Rei Terada calls the
“expressive hypothesis” (11). She hypothesizes that: “the purpose of expression
tropes is to extrapolate a human subject circularly from the phenomenon of
emotion” ––or, the idea that “emotion requires a subject; thus we’re subjects,
since we have emotions” (Terada 11). This circularity is one feature of the
ideology of emotion, which is Terada’s name for Ahmed’s “inside out” model,
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wherein expression is seen as feeling originating in a subject and travelling
outward, and is a dominant way of speaking about feeling in our culture.
Similarly, when we consider dance a self-expressive practice––that is, a
person’s danced movement is an expression of her feelings and perhaps who
she is inside––we are able to extrapolate a subject’s identity from that very
movement. These are two distinct definitions of self-expression (to let out one’s
feelings, as well as to become one’s self through action) working together in the
same direction. The result is that every dancing body is an “I,” whose ways of
moving indicate through expression both:
1) her feelings; and
2) her subjective identity as a dancer of a particular dance form.
It would seem, therefore, that certain dance forms come to be associated with
certain bodies, as well as certain feelings, imagined or perceived––all via this
figure of expression, self-expression.
And yet for many, self-expression is more than just a way to speak about
or imagine dance; it is also a way to define dance. I will now consider Sondra
Fraleigh Horton’s Dance and the Lived Body: A Descriptive Aesthetics. My main
focus will be her discussion of the shift from modern to postmodern dance
(beginning in the 1950s), with regards to her understandings of dance as an
aesthetic and expressive practice. It is worth noting, however, that Horton’s
project is explicitly philosophical, as she works “to develop an aesthetic
prescriptive of dance through existential phenomenology––particularly through
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the concept of the lived body” (xiii). This announcement of aesthetic
prescriptivism––an opinion not only as to what dance is or has been, but what it
should be ideally––underscores what is at stake for Horton in defining dance,
and later, in expressing distaste for the postmodern attitude. However, given her
stated philosophical approach, her prescriptivism is as much an ardent effort to
align dance with certain concepts––for her, they appear to be the aesthetic, the
expressive, and the lived body––as it is a proposal for regulation. This does not
make her opinions in this particular work any less conservative, in my
estimation. But it does draw my attention to the degree to which concepts are
relied upon, by dancers and theorists alike and no matter their tastes, to bring
dance into concrete legibility. Rather than discount Horton for her prescriptive
attitude, I wonder what concepts have guided me toward my own experiences
of dance. Have they ever limited my ability to experience movement? Which of
my ideas have had an effect on how I move? In light of these questions, this
chapter will finish with a brief discussion of the ideological character of selfexpression as a concept in dance and its categorization into forms.
Furthermore, it is worth noting explicitly that Dance and the Lived Body
was written in 1987. I chose to work with this text because, for me, it clearly
demonstrates a way of speaking about dance that relies upon the belief system
that Rei Terada named the expressive hypothesis and that Sara Ahmed called
the inside-out model. Along these lines, Horton defends dance as an expressive
practice after several decades of what she saw as blatant anti-expressionism in
dance-making. In trying to understand my own non-expressive efforts as a
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dance-maker, it felt critical to study an argument that works in the opposite
direction, and I selected Horton’s work on the topic, authored over thirty years
ago. I recognize that this scholarly move has its consequences. But as a
practitioner, I experience––all of the time, really––considerable insistence that
good dance is expressive. I felt quite driven to find this insistence articulated in
writing. Horton’s work from thirty years ago struck me as relevant here, and I do
not find its prescriptivism antiquated in the least; its ways of speaking are still in
circulation––in the studio, after performances, in written criticism, everywhere.
Rei Terada wonders “whether it is really necessary to criticize expression; as an
aesthetic doctrine it seems rather outdated” (11). In this chapter, I will suggest
that this aesthetic doctrine is not outdated, at all.
***
Early in Dance and the Lived Body, Sondra Fraleigh Horton points to the
popularity of the view that dance is self-expression, and that “one of [her] aims,
then, is to reduce the belief that dance is self-expression, so that we may more
clearly see the unique substance of dancing and the self that is created, known,
and expressed in it” (7). For her, dance is not simply self-expressive because it
also aesthetic expression; a scream is self-expressive but not aesthetic.
Furthermore, it is beyond self-expressive in that dance offers a unique
opportunity for self-transcendence, expressive not of a personal self, but of a
universalized or depersonalized self. As such, it seems that Horton disavows
self-expression primarily to clarify the philosophical concepts she aligns with,
but not to do away with the way self-expression works to generate subjects
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from feelings and vice versa. For this reason, the idea never fully disappears in
her analysis, despite her aim to reduce its presence. Consider these quotations
from Horton:
1) “all of the arts are aesthetic and created forms of expression” (22);
2) “the universal and (bodily lived) capacity to express, to extend our
boundaries through expression, to move out of ourselves and be received
by others, is the human capacity upon which dancing is founded” (68);
3) “the act of expressing in dance is synonymous with the movement
medium in dance” (102);
4) “dance exists through human movement, which is always psychophysical
expressive form” (103);
5) “that is, without expression there is no dance” (103);
6) “we may say that dance is expressive by nature” (125); and
7) “Expression cannot be blanked without removing the dancer herself”
(125).
I recognize that none of these statements directly supports a self-expressive
definition of dance; in terms of Horton’s philosophical work, there is no category
mistake here, given her outlined terms. But neither do any of the quotations
imagine dance as a practice that may not need the figure of expression, at all.
And even when a body is not self-expressing per se, I remain concerned about
uncritical faith in the idea that the body can be perceived as expressive––that is,
communicative in some sense––at all times, or that its very movement is
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expressive innately. For me, this is the same logic that ultimately gives rise to
the she was asking for it rationale for sexual misconduct. In this line of thinking,
a body in a certain form––dressed in a certain way, walking at a certain time of
night or standing on a corner––expresses a form of consent. The belief that
“each person’s walk expresses him” should not be disseminated as an aesthetic
feature of dance, precisely because it can perpetuate cultural problems (Horton
121).
Horton is also careful to prescribe that dance is aesthetic expression as
opposed to personal expression. And in being aesthetically intended, Horton
sees dance as “movement detached from instrumental usefulness” or the
movement of a person as she moves throughout daily life (27). As such, “Dance
moves the self beyond a personal identity because it is conditioned by the
aesthetic” (Horton 28).
Horton further characterizes the self as expressed through dance as follows:
1) “[…] the dancer’s body and her self are created in the dance object––
created as the dance” (37);
2) “The dancer realizes the self––or comes to know herself––in terms of her
capacity to create the self of her fullest possibilities” (38);
3) “The self the dancer comes to know and express emerges from a
synthesis of the personal and the universal” (29);
4) “When I am my dance, it is my self unlimited that is expressed” (33);
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5) “The self the dancer projects is chosen: a selected, aesthetically
constituted, and practiced self” (33); and
6) “Although I am embodied in my dance, it is not who I am that is projected
in my dance. […] I do not express the personal manner in which I am not
my self; I express the dance” (32).
Despite her aim of reducing the widespread belief that dance is self-expression,
Horton certainly foregrounds a conception of the self––albeit an aesthetic and
universalized self––in her definitions of dance. Recall that this was also the case
in her defense of expression. I will also add that, for Horton, “the aesthetic exists
intrinsically in the subjective field” –– a space in which human subjects
communicate to each other, and that “is lived by each individual as the self”
(44). And in a second definition of the aesthetic, Horton writes: “I am proposing
that the aesthetic is defined as the affective, is a quality of being moved, in the
sense that when I say ‘I am moved’ I mean ‘I feel something,” and in fact my
sense of feeling has been increased. Moreover, when I say I feel something, I am
implying an awareness of my sentient self” (45). Dance, then, is an affective
activity for feeling subjects, who in feeling are fully sentient of their selfhood
from the outset, and in expressing, convey an aestheticized ideal self. In my
view, this remains self-expression.
I will speak directly: in the versions of this that I have tried on as a dancer,
I have felt beauty in it as a project. I contract and I feel myself hollow––I become
another self. But then I am distracted again by the feelings themselves––the
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feelings which are not me, but that give shape to me––and which cannot be
contained by any self I could imagine. They move quite freely and move my
body to dance. I move most freely when I allow their freedom, and when I
intervene only occasionally.
Perhaps Horton and I are describing the same phenomenon but in
different terms. Regardless, I hold that the terms in which we talk about dance
precisely affect how our work comes to be perceived and discussed––how it is
experienced. I object to the notion of self-expression only because it limits, by
prescribing the precise edges of human subjects, the single direction in which
feelings travel, and that dance is a necessarily communicative effort, which I will
address now. Yet Horton works to dispel the image from popular use in order to
foreground the particular, aesthetic features of dance that she hopes to
prescribe from a philosophical standpoint. Therefore, when she turns to confront
the “antiexpressionist” legacy of the postmodern dance, she does so in terms
that to me feel quite antithetical to what was a historical effort in feeling anew.
***
Horton moves toward a discussion of dance forms by adding to her
notion of expression. For her, expression holds action and content in unity. She
writes: “To express, then, moves from its phenomenal position as an action verb
to the nominative position of an expression, one which has been accomplished
and named according to some qualitative content” (Horton 102). What we
perceive a dancer to be doing in a dance is immediately “a marking of [the
dance’s] content” (Horton 102). This becomes the grounds upon which Horton
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unpacks what she calls the formalist-expressionist tension, which is often
viewed as a divide between modern and postmodern dance. For Horton, action
(expression; feeling) and content (expressive content; form) exist in unity in a
dancer’s movement, “which is always psychophysical expressive form,” and
thus, she disputes the distinction outright (103).
This may be a productive frame for watching a dance as one interprets a
text, but in line with my objections above, it limits. Not all dancers dance to reify
meaningful content. This is not simply the distinction between choreography
and improvisation, or a dancer dancing a dance as opposed to simply dancing.
There are some dances––set or otherwise––which are not designed to
communicate at all, and in fact work in other directions. This might make it bad
dance, depending on one’s tastes! But it is dance regardless. Dance became a
theatrical art form, wherein what is on stage can be viewed as interpretable,
artistic content, but prior to and alongside this re-contextualization of dance
itself, it has performed other cultural functions, as well.
Horton notices that “expression as subjective content (psychological,
emotional, symbolic, and so on) has been closely associated with modern
dance” which “has always existed in dynamic tension with the formal (structural)
considerations” (103). This interest in “the formative object of dance” or a
“return to consciousness of things in themselves” became the explicit focus of
early postmodern choreographers such as Merce Cunningham (Horton 111). As
described in Horton’s sense of the unity of form and feeling in dance, it is not
along the lines of expression and form that these two traditions can be
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differentiated. She holds that “even formalist dance such as Cunningham’s is
innately expressive because it exists though the innately expressive human
body” even if Cunningham succeeded in visibly “cool[ing]” the expression down
(Horton 113; 119). By extension, “emptying art of expression” is impossible
according to Horton, as cool expression is still expression (118). Speaking of the
generation of dancers that followed Cunningham, she writes: “antiexpression is
expression but, curiously enough, expression against itself” (Horton 124).
This is an insistence that there are still feelings in the dancer’s body, even if
the dancer is immobile and stares blankly at her audience for an hour. For
Horton, it is irresponsible to call one’s self a dancer and not express those
feelings through movement. My attitude here is that the feelings are not only in
the dancer but in the room. I notice that Horton turns to her own feelings in
watching this work, describing them with a certain vehemence; they move her to
defend dance in order to defend the human itself. “The human develops through
elaborating and extending expressive values, not through hiding, blanking or
diminishing them” (Horton 125). In other words, “the human being grows
through expression” (Horton 124; my emphasis). I celebrate the early
postmodern work for diminishing the visibility of the human being––the willful,
ever-expressive “I” of the dancer as author and subject––in order to mobilize the
feelings of the room, among other things. Some of my favorite dance makes me
want to dance in that it moves me. At that moment historically, this was
accomplished by stilling the dancer’s body and its expressive output. The work
was aesthetic, but it also strikes me as political. A woman on stage at that time
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was expected to perform, to look out and to give––to express. Drawing attention
to the feelings in the audience that create that problematic expectation was of
dire necessity, and still is in many ways. In some moments, it is awareness itself
that must grow, and not the human being. If I avoid your gaze as I lightly toss
my body around, what will you become aware of? There are other ways of
increasing awareness certainly, but this may have been a new way.
To reiterate: one new way to feel––to feel better perhaps––is to notice that
feelings are not only in me, but everywhere around me. Nor are they me. Rather,
they are things in themselves. This can become a practice; dancers often dance
and make dance through practice. Horton disagrees with the critic, historian,
and postmodern apologist Sally Banes, and her feeling that “a new definition of
dance (not simply a new style) had appeared” (119). This redefinition, in Banes’s
own words, espoused “neither perfection of technique nor of expression, but
quite something else––the presentation of objects in themselves” (ctd. in Horton
119; my emphasis). This turn to dance-as-object is often understood to be a
step away from expressionism toward formalism. But more specifically, it
appears to me that postmodern dance, in minimizing both the primacy of
technical movement vocabulary and the expressive effort of the dancing
subject––two mainstay features of Western concert dance for at least several
centuries––was re-presenting the body as a means to experience dance. This is
not a body imagined in the form of a narrative character, an expressed emotion,
or as the dance itself, but the presentation of a body as it exists outside of these
figural scenarios. My sense is that in working to present just the body, emotions
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themselves became more visible, too. These feelings may not have felt like
dance. This was not feeling in the form of “expressive content” (something like
might be confused with subject matter, narrative, meaning, or even poetic
communication), but feeling proper (Horton 117).
Meanwhile, Horton maintains that the new postmodern dance was merely a
“stylistic departure” from modern dance, and remained dance in nature and
modern in character (119). In the sense of being another avant-garde expression
in the modern tradition of making new and not defining itself, and in striving to
reflect the modern subject’s individuality and freedom, postmodern dance was
simply bad modern dance––a reflection of slackening in philosophical and
aesthetic values (Horton xxxii).
And yet I would like to return to the idea of practice, as a repetition of
acts that brings something––dance, for example––into being. In fact, it was not
the first iterations of postmodern dance that Horton found troubling. She even
describes Yvonne Rainer’s subdued, pedestrian style in Trio A (1966) as
expressing a kind of grace “through the working intelligence of a subtly detailed
body,” and appropriately political, when read to be a form of Vietnam-era
protest art against “techne”––technique and technology (Horton 120; 132).
Rather, it was the slow degeneration of expressivity over time, through repeated
performance of the style after Judson Church, that concerned her. She writes:
I witnessed years of blank, smugly cool, walk-away dances throughout
the postmodern period. This formula for avoiding feeling (and for not
being square) became widespread. Was it an attempt to overcome
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poverty of the spirit by expressing it? Or was it impoverished art? There
were probably examples of both. Audiences walked away from dance as
dance walked away from them. Walking away and looking away became
characteristic, almost stylistic, in these dances. Dancers habitually
walked away and looked away from each other onstage. Cool gradually
became vacant. (Horton 127)
The repeated acts that brought postmodern dance into popular visibility––
walking away, looking away––also slowly vacated the stage of humans and their
expressions. It cleared space for bodies to feel, in my estimation. As such,
postmodern dance best refers to the work that came of that practice––dance as
the work of feeling bodies––as opposed to those years of stylistic imitation that
followed the initial shift, but whose dances were paradigmatically no different in
conception from earlier forms. My sense is that, in awe of this new way to
practice feeling, dancers spent several decades perhaps not moving much––or
at least, not moving in the ways many expected dancers to move.
***
This is not the practice of a new style or vocabulary, but a new practice in
feeling, which can give new shape to a body as it moves through that feeling
over time––as it feels things out. New dance can be one result of a new practice
in feeling. As this dance is performed, discussed, and eventually taught, perhaps
a new dance form takes shape. This is not a new definition of dance, only a new
practice. It is (hopefully) not the case that ballet is dance while butoh is not
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dance, simply because they are distinct dance practices, specific to distinct
cultures, with distinctive practices when it comes to feeling.
Interestingly, one of the branches of recent scholarship on emotion––as
summarized by the historian William Reddy––is largely conducted by
ethnographers who have “developed new field techniques and a new theoretical
apparatus for understanding the cultural dimension of emotion” (x). Reddy notes
that, in this anthropological research, “ethnographic data routinely contains
traces of collective shaping of emotional effort and collective elaboration of
emotional ideals” (56). Citing many of the same scholars cited by Sara Ahmed
when she aligns herself with those “who have argued that emotions should not
be regarded as psychological states, but as social and cultural practices,”
Reddy thoroughly analyzes this approach to studying emotion as reiterative
social practice (Ahmed 9). His concept of emotional culture as an effortful
elaboration of values and ideals through local, lived practice, or as Reddy further
characterizes it, a culture’s “normative style of emotional management” is
instrumental to his own argument in The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for
the History of Emotions (121). Reddy maintains that history itself is “a record of
human efforts to conceptualize our emotional makeup, and to realize social and
political orders attuned to its nature” (xxi). He mobilizes his argument to critique
this ethnographic method, holding that the “anthropology of emotions most
sorely lacks, at present, a unified concept of emotions as part of the historical
unfolding of politically significant institutions and practice” (Reddy 50). In other
words, emotions and emotional practices shape history, rather than being
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shaped by changes in history. He builds this framework in order to discuss the
French Revolution, in explicitly emotional terms.
I am interested in Reddy’s notion of “emotional management” (121). He
writes: “a normative style of emotional management is a fundamental element of
every political regime, of every cultural hegemony” (Reddy 121). I would add: of
every aesthetic regime as well. I have begun to describe differences in style with
regard to emotional management between modern and postmodern dance, and
I will notice more differences when I consider flamenco. To call each of these
dance forms an aesthetic regime is perhaps strong wording; I feel, however, that
the phrase speaks directly to the issue that I began this chapter with––the
extrapolation of dancers as subjects of the dance form they express: I am a
modern dancer. To identify in this way, in many senses, is to align with norms in
feeling, or else, to practice in a community of movers that “provide[s] individuals
with prescriptions and counsel concerning the best strategies for pursuing
emotional learning and the proper end point or ideal of emotional equilibrium”
(Reddy 55). We see such explicitly prescriptive work in Dance and the Lived
Body. It would be vastly uncritical, however, to associate emotionally
prescriptive management practices solely with modern dance. All dance
communities prescribe and manage, whether explicitly in their pedagogies, or
implicitly through any number of other apparatuses. Regardless, it is worth
stating once more that I believe this management work is performed not only
with regards to movement aesthetics or choreographic practices––the material
manifestations of dance––but also in the realm of the emotional.
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Later in this essay, I will describe the ways in which my training as a
flamenco dancer introduced me to some alternative styles of emotional
management. This is not to say that the edict to express one’s self was not
entirely absent there. In being a concert dance form with European origins,
flamenco has in some ways taken similar shape to the modern and postmodern
dance forms; flamenco has, after all, lived through the same historical eras of
modernity and postmodernity, and is essentially unique as a dance form first for
its relationship with the music form––flamenco. I will therefore turn to its music
to study the majority of flamenco’s emotional uniqueness. Before then, I’d like to
imagine the dance form less as a community of movers or as a regime, and
more as a collective body––that is, a body.
In Choreographing Empathy: Kinesthesia in Performance the theorist and
historian Susan Leigh Foster lays out three concurrent, genealogical analyses of
the terms choreography, kinesthesia, and empathy. In doing so, she puts
pressure on various conceptions of an immediate or innate relationship between
a dancer’s body and a viewer’s body, wherein by nature of also having a body,
viewers feel what dancers feel. Instead, Foster contends that this “natural or
spontaneous connection” has always been historically specific, offering that “the
viewer’s rapport is shaped by common and prevailing senses of the body and of
subjectivity in a given social moment” (2). These prevailing senses radically
change over time. She writes: “I argue that any notion of choreography contains,
embodied within it, a kinethesis, a designated way of experiencing physicality
and movement that, in turn, summons other bodies into a specific way of feeling
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towards it” (Foster 2). Foster’s notion of choreographing empathy “thus entails
the construction and cultivation of a specific physicality whose kinesthetic
experience guides our perception of and connection to what another is feeling”
(2).
Foster’s notion of choreography has taken shape over the course of her
career. She summarizes that, for her, “‘choreography’ can productively be
conceptualized as a theorization of identity––corporeal, individual, and social” or
“as a product of choices, inherited, invented, or selected, about what kinds of
bodies and subjects are being constructed and what kinds of arguments about
these bodies as subjects are being put forth” (Foster 4). In this light, I consider
bodies to be expressive of certain dance forms once I allow that dance forms
are made of dances, practiced by dancers, and that a dance form is a body of
those dances and dancers. The identities––corporeal, individual, and social––of
the dancers themselves are choreographed, cultivated, and constructed by way
of the body of dances they practice and perform. Meanwhile, a prevailing sense
of those bodies takes shape in the very same act of the dances taking shape
through choreographic labor. As I have detailed, attention to the processes
through which bodies take shape and become visible––corporeally, individually,
and socially––is a way to conceptualize a theorization of emotion, as well. And
as Reddy noted, the processes through which historical change takes shape is
also contingent on those bodies and their feelings.
This becomes an important analytical tool for me, moving forward. Each
dancing body presents a physicality as it moves, which choreographically
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models an attitude toward emotion, as the body itself performs a practiced
management of feeling. Furthermore, Foster works in Choreographing Empathy
specifically “to demonstrate how dance practices have been aligned with rather
than isolated from other forms of cultural and knowledge production” (12). She
describes a range of physical practices that “function collectively to establish a
specific conception of the body and its parts and to organize protocols for
shaping and fashioning the body and training its movement” ––such as physical
education, training in etiquette, and medical practice itself (Foster 13). I would
also note that the diversity of physical practices within dance creates an equally
wide range of conceptions of one’s body, of organizational protocols, and of
course, of emotional management styles. Each form works to produce
distinctive knowledges and cultures through these very conceptions, protocols,
and styles. This happens through physicalized practice and discourse over
time––by way of a body itself. Dance forms become like a body in this process,
acquiring a specific set of cultural knowledge through physical practice––
instruction on how to use, as well as how to feel, that very body.
When I imagine a dance form as a body, I am less inclined to quickly read
its movement as a visual representation or expression, formally distinct from
another dance form’s movement––that is, as a rigid, aesthetic category. When I
turn to a dance form as I would to a body moving before me, I see that it is
working through feeling by moving its own body. I see how it manages that
feeling: by expressing it, by looking away and toward something else, by
surrendering to it, or by way of some other strategy. I see how it uses its body
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when it performs this work––how it cares for it or does not, how it names its
parts, when it rests and how it dreams. I notice when and where people become
visible in all this movement, and when and where they fade away, becoming
something else again. My attention is drawn to patterns and disruptions;
problems and small miracles; feelings that result from feeling other feelings. The
dance form has its history and remains quite specific––definitively itself in so
many ways––but I also watch it expand before my very eyes as it moves, as it
dances in and out of its own past, as it feels its way into a future.
***
Ngai offers that specific kinds of emotion can “be said to determine
specific ‘literary kinds’” or forms (9). She recalls that the philosopher Thomas
Hobbes, in Leviathan, argues that “the human fear of ‘invisible spirits’ (which,
prior to the time of civil society, superseded our fear of the power of other
humans) gave rise to a specific form or genre: the oath” (Ngai 9). In fact, she
brilliantly writes in Ugly Feelings about “feelings that contain, as it were, models
of the problem that defines them” and that, as such, have been given form
through unique and specific forms of literary expression––Claymation movies,
infamously bad or non-cathartic novels, the genre of film noir (Ngai 21). Part of
the problem with the specific kind of emotion that is self-expression is that it
prescribes what is to be done with it; it creates a form in its very definition, and
that form becomes difficult to move beyond. When I consider writing from
Yvonne Rainer in the next chapter of this essay, I will notice the ways in which
she worked to do away with the so-called movement phrase. I understand the
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phrase to be movement and feeling in self-expressive form––for me, a phrase
often tells a small story of the life of an emotion, moving from inside a person
outward, reaching a climax, then dying. Rainer worked to move beyond it.
Dancing a phrase feels good! There is nothing wrong with phrases; I love
them! But I assume that it feels so good in part because it aligns with my own
preconceived notions of how feelings feel. And one danger of self-expressive
models of emotion, if they remain too prominent in our field for too long, is that
they will ossify. New or other ways of moving and feeling will become more and
more difficult to see, as self-expressive movement patterns will become so
deeply ingrained in dancers’ bodies and minds that concert dance physicality
itself will harden in line with those patterns, too.
I described this argument to a friend who dances and ironically, she
commented that she never quite feels free to express herself in the first place.
The trained habits of her body are, by now, so ingrained that she experiences no
sensation of free-flowing emotion from in to out whatsoever. Instead, she is
constantly re-negotiating her body’s habits, in an effort to be a better dancer, so
that she may eventually feel the feeling of expressing herself artfully. Dancing
the phrases of other dancers becomes welcome respite in this ongoing, strange
labor of the self-expressive dancer.
Sianne Ngai defines ideology as “the materially embodied representation
of an imaginary relationship to a holistic complex of real conditions” (47). Feeling
feelings is a quite real, human condition that I enter into an imaginary
relationship with when I imagine that those feelings are inside me and that I
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must express them in order to get them out, in order to feel better, or in order to
be taken seriously as a dance artist. As I make materially embodied
representations of that experience––a career of dances, full of self-expressive
phrases––it distorts, over time, the very realness of my feelings through
reiterative practice. Through a repeated imaginative act, I experience my body
as a container of feelings that are my responsibility because they are me until I
express them. My body is who I am and it cannot be escaped; eventually the
responsibility of my body and my feelings becomes burdensome. Sometimes
imagined burdens can inflict drastic physical harm.
Instead, let us occasionally recognize, as Jane Bennett does, that my
body is hardly me at all. Each of us “are, rather, an array of bodies, many
different kinds of them in a nested set of microbiomes” (112). With regards to
my body, it is a scientific matter of fact that “the its outnumber the mes” when I
remember that––in the crook of my elbow alone––there live six different tribes of
bacteria who together have at least 100 times as many genes as there are in the
human genome (Bennett 112). Science cannot be the only way out of ideological
entrapment, mind you, but we have to get moving to be sure.

57

Chapter Three
A history: postmodern dance and feelings themselves
In the following two chapters, I will position my work in Sensaciones y
emociones within two intertwining dance historical lineages. In this chapter, I
consider the history of postmodern dance, and in the next I will look to the
history of flamenco. I am motivated here to document the key influences on this
project as specifically as I can. Therefore, rather than studying changes over
time within each of these two dance forms as if they were distinct aesthetic
categories––to eventually arrive at my own work––I would instead like to
continue looking closely at bodies and how they are used and described in
relation to feelings, or how those feelings are managed through dance work, at
different moments in history. This will be helpful in eventually naming the
feelings I worked with in Sensaciones y emociones, and how I managed them. In
fact, some of those feelings were not my own per se, but feelings I was trying
on––that I directly borrowed from these two dance histories. And just as art
historians often focus on a single art object in order to begin imagining a history,
I would like to start narrowing my frame of reference in this essay, too. To do so,
I will identify specific instances in which dancers have made a practice of
presenting feelings themselves, as opposed to expressing them. What were
those feelings and what were the practices?
My mind is now on art history in part because I was first introduced to
Yvonne Rainer’s The Mind is a Muscle Part One, Trio A (1966) in one of my
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undergraduate courses, “American Art since 1950,” taught by David Joselit. It
was the first piece of art we studied that semester, and I had never heard of the
piece nor of Rainer before then. I wasn’t dancing at that time; seeing the grainy
footage of all that unremarkable movement was enough to make me cry. In this
chapter, I will begin with the historian Ramsay Burt’s Judson Dance Theater:
Performative Traces––an excellent resource for those who, like me, have felt
indebted to postmodern dance and its legacy but remain uncertain exactly why.
The majority of the dance I make looks nothing like Rainer’s.
To paint a quick picture to begin: a work like Trio A is such a great
opening act in a survey course on American art since Abstract Expressionism
for several reasons. As Burt details, the postmodern dance apologist Sally
Banes drew upon debates in the art theory of her time to make her cases.
Meanwhile, Rainer herself was intimately involved with the artist Robert Morris, a
founding figure of the so-called minimalist art movement––sometimes called
literalist art––in which sculptors began crafting and displaying objects like
unadorned cubes in various sizes. And finally, Rainer herself beautifully
describes the unadorned, pedestrian movement and its “worklike rather than
exhibitionlike presentation” in Trio A as “‘minimalist’ tendencies” ––or, a kind of
expressive minimalism (385; 381). There is a lot going on here, apparently
enough to move me to tears. In this chapter, I will unpack this feeling as a way
to position myself in a lineage, and as a way to add to this essay’s slowly
growing central concept: feelings themselves.
***
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Ramsay Burt tightly summarizes that “whereas the generation of abstract
expressionist painters and modern dancers had made claims about the
uniqueness of their individual, internal experience, Rainer was primarily
concerned with the public nature of artistic production” (90). This is, again, not a
turn to formalist aesthetics but rather, an effort “to strip dance practice of
unverifiable private associations in order to find a dance vocabulary that would
be meaningful in this public space” (Burt 90). Earlier, I called this a presentation
to the public of the body itself––a plain display of a body to demonstrate that, in
being socially specific and culturally situated, the body is itself meaning-filled.
Burt’s overall project, then, is to describe the postmodern legacy––in Europe
and the US––as a turn to “the materiality of the dancing body in ways that force
the spectator to acknowledge the materiality of the bodies of […] dancers” (2;
my emphasis). In this way, Burt’s work is less a survey of postmodern
movement aesthetics, and more an acknowledgement of the growing
sociopolitical and theoretical awareness in dance artists since the postmodern
shift.
He notes that one such turn to theory was performed by Sally Banes, in
her defenses of the avant-garde dance work of the 1960s. Interestingly, she
turned not to poststructuralism, but to the quintessentially modernist art theory
of the critics Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried, to announce what she saw
as a confusion of terms by the field of dance in calling postmodern dance
postmodern at all. It was a perspective she defended for several decades, and
one that Burt criticizes. Sally Banes wrote: “‘Often it has been precisely in the
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arena of post-modern dance that issues of modernism in the other arts have
arisen: the acknowledgement of the medium’s materials, the revealing of dance’s
essential qualities as an art form, the separation of external references as
subjects’” (ctd. in Burt 8). This perspective stems from Banes’s conviction, cited
earlier in this essay, that the Judson Church dances finally presented objects
themselves––that is, dance without representational or expressive content, or
something like pure dance. Meanwhile, Burt explains that this notion of purity
was pivotal in the work of the modernist art critics Greenberg and Fried, who
believed Abstract Expressionist painting to be modern art par excellence
precisely for its formal purity––paint thrown on a canvas, nothing but pure
materiality. Furthermore, these critics held that artistic progress toward high
modernist purity was “independent of social and political factors” and could only
occur when artists devoted themselves purely to aesthetic problems, “unaffected,
and disengaged from, the political context in which they are working” (Burt 10).
This is precisely the type of work Sally Banes felt she was seeing when
she watched postmodern dance, which is why she found it to be inappropriately
named. And if postmodern dance is actually modernist in character, then all this
was––as Banes argued––“further complicated by the fact that historical modern
dance was never really modernist” in mistakenly seeing itself as pure dance, too
(ctd. in Burt 8). Burt criticizes this perspective, recognizing that the Judson
Church artists were, in fact, more socially and politically motivated than not, even
as they made avant-garde, formally minimal dance works. He attentively reminds
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that “avant-garde attacks on art are an attack on the only institution over which
artists have influence,” and that these attacks remain culturally oriented
regardless (Burt 11). This art was rarely concerned with aesthetic issues alone.
I feel silly reiterating an old debate over a line in the sand, but I am
fascinated by the feelings of confusion here. The amount of emotional investment
in categorizing dance is not arbitrary here; as I have already suggested, the effort
to name what we see in another person’s moving body is challenging, in that it is
very akin to the challenge of naming what we feel ourselves. My inclination is not
to chalk all of this up to pettiness, but instead, to proceed in the way that Burt
does, which is to see that the problem here is the concept repeatedly being
invoked––the impossible notion of pure dance, abstract dance, or dance that is
movement itself, nothing else. This illusionistic concept works to obscure what is
actually being seen in every dance: humans themselves who––even when in
motion––cannot be abstracted beyond the cultural context in which they live and
dance. The various announcements throughout dance history of an arrival at
pure dance through a new technique or conceptual approach have not
adequately addressed the fact that every dancer is first a person. Or at least, is
first a person until she actively works to perform otherwise––by beginning a
practice of reiteratively working toward a new reality over time.
As such, postmodern dance came into being alongside other artistic
projects such as Fluxus Happenings, performance art, and minimalist visual art–
–all projects that began to perform in new directions. This was why Professor
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Joselit began his course with Trio A. Minimalist art (the first major American
visual art movement after Abstract Expressionism) is infamously difficult to
introduce to students; many wonder if a series of uniform, metal cubes––factory
produced––can count as artistic innovation at all. The avant-garde goals of the
movement, however, become much more clear to me in watching a body perform
so-called minimalist tendencies. As I described with regards to Horton’s response
to postmodern dance, this type of artmaking draws heightened attention to the
spectator’s own experience of it, even if only by requiring that the spectator
cognitively reason that what she is seeing is, in fact, art––or is, in fact, dance. In
watching Rainer minimalize her expressivity, Horton was moved to defend her
beliefs; I was moved to tears; the both of us were encouraged into an affective
relationship with the work. Similarly, Robert Morris’s sculptures strived to
increase the viewer’s awareness of her own bodily co-presence with the work––
her embodied relationship to an object of perception in real time, in a public
space. The modernist art critic Michael Fried disparaged this approach to
artmaking by calling it theatrical, and therefore, not visual (Burt 12). As such, this
shift marks the beginning of a long trend of American visual artists seeing
themselves as performers––of their views, of their identities, of their
interventions––even in the creation of static art objects.
The “oppositional, critical” quality of this avant-gardism is, for me at least,
a pleasure to watch when performed by a person, using her body. Of course,
depending on their execution, these behaviors can come off as pretentious or
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smug. But the sincere effort of using a body to somehow encourage another to
notice her own beliefs and feelings is fascinating to me. On this, Burt writes: “In
retrospect [the postmodern] legacy to subsequent generations of dancers has
been a body of work and theory that set a precedent for transcending this
narcissistic-voyeuristic duality” wherein the performer self-expresses from “an
illusionistic center or interiority” while the viewer mutely sits nearby and receives
the expression, content, and meaning (87; 86). The critic Rosalind Krauss, who
Burt relies on here, offered that minimal artists were instead “asking that meaning
be seen as arising from––to continue the analogy with language––a public rather
than a private space” (ctd. in Burt 85). I sense that Krauss carefully notes her
analogy here to recognize that invoking meaning is helpful, but not entirely
precise. That is, I imagine that the very experience of Rainer’s minimalist
tendencies, performed in 1966––her use of “energy equality and ‘found’
movement,” its “neutral performance,” all the “task or tasklike activity” onstage,
the averted gazes––were enough to encourage a public feeling, whatever the
feeling was at that time. Meaning was probably not immediately necessary. The
profound difference could, I imagine, be felt: whether emotionally or energetically.
***
I am influenced by this work when I recall my conviction that my feelings
are hard to talk about, but that if I allow them to be free, they might mobilize me
and the audience toward new feelings over time. In Trio A, Yvonne Rainer tamed
the forceful energetic output of self-expressive movement––to begin re-
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sensitizing herself and her audience, and to mobilize new, public feeling. She
had specific, avant-garde motivations for doing so in the era that she worked, but
she also developed a set of protocols for managing one’s movement that, in my
estimation, possessed broader utility. These are protocols for using your body;
she spells them out in an essay called “A Quasi Survey of Some ‘Minimalist’
Tendencies in the Quantitatively Minimal Dance Activity Midst the Plethora, or an
Analysis of Trio A” and I have studied them carefully. This is where I will begin to
suggest overlap between various postmodern emotional management styles and
those that I have been exposed to through my training as a flamenco dancer. I
maintain that––no matter the discipline––these are practical tools for performers
who work to minimalize the look and feel of self-expression, and in doing so, may
clear space on stage for feelings themselves.
I have already mentioned my sense of the self-expressive character of a
movement phrase. I developed this idea in reading Rainer’s “A Quasi Survey,”
and her belief that among the postmodern changes in movement invention,
the most impressive has been in the attitude to phrasing, which can be
defined as the way in which energy is distributed in the execution of a
movement or series of movements. What makes one kind of movement
different from another is not so much variations in arrangements of parts
of the body as differences in energy investment. (Rainer 382; my
emphasis)
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My experience is that many dancers, in avoidance of speaking of their
work in personal terms, often substitute the concept of emotion for the more
neutral concepts of energy or effort. This is not to say that these words are
synonymous; in fact, it would require considerable additional research to
describe the history of energy as a concept in our field. However, Susan Leigh
Foster captures something important about this distinction when she offers that,
by the early twentieth century, the body came to be regarded as “a tensile and
momentum-driven force that alternately exerts and relaxes in relation to gravity”
(9). Modern dance choreographers “commandeered this physicality into
expressive action” (Foster 178). A trained modern dancer like Rainer was likely
very accustomed to measuring expressive action in terms of energy, both
quantitatively and qualitatively. For example, it is common in dance training, as
Rainer notes, “to tell a student that he is using ‘too much energy’” (382). I find
that it is not so common to tell him that he is using too much feeling. Because
Rainer crafted a “continuum of energy” or “energy equality” in the movement of
Trio A that is often seen as antiexpressionist, and because she worked to create
this quality specifically through work on phrasing, I became curious about the
phrase being:
1)

a vehicle for emotional expression, as well as

2)

“a particular distribution of energy” within set movement (Rainer

384; 383).
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Here, Rainer describes how this work on phrasing was choreographed “in the
direction of movement-as-task or movement-as-object”:
One of the most singular elements in [Trio A] is that there are no pauses
between phrases. The phrases themselves often consist of separate
parts, such as consecutive limb articulations––‘right leg, left leg, arms,
jump,’ etc.––but the end of each phrase merges immediately into the
beginning of the next with no observable accent. The limbs are never in a
fixed, still relationship and they are stretched to their fullest extension only
in transit, creating the impression that the body is constantly engaged in
transitions.” (384–5)
When I first read this, I gasped. For me, Trio A’s choreographed equality of
energetic output performs the very work of emotional management for the
audience. It draws attention to what is, for many of us, ongoing effort––the quiet
modulation and control of our feelings. Rather than continue in the tradition of
staging one heroic emotion expressed after another (i.e., a dancer dancing
discrete phrases), Rainer’s dance presents an alternative, less cathartic, and
perhaps more realistic view of emotional life. Feelings blur one into the other;
attending to them is a task or requires work, or at least sensitivity; the feelings
transition so quickly that it is difficult to ever keep hold of one and truly call it
one’s own.
These descriptions also suggest a certain monotony, which seems to be
why this movement quality is often called pedestrian or worklike. It never
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becomes a herculean energetic effort, but instead, presents the slow,
commonplace burning of “ordinary affects”––an affective dynamic described by
theorist Kathleen Stewart (2). For Rainer, the dancing body became involved with
feeling only through a sort of passivity––showing what it looks like to “move or be
moved by some thing rather than oneself” (384). This work was hardly devoid of
feeling; it simply offered that to express feeling is a “more-than-human,” even
rarefied aesthetic effort (Rainer 383). On her own feelings during Trio A, she
wrote that, in fact, “I was more involved in experiencing a lion’s share of ecstasy
and madness than in ‘being myself’ or doing a job” (Rainer 383). That is, feelings
themselves did appear––in fact, a lion’s share of them––just as Rainer worked to
minimalize them. Paradoxically, this was accomplished by no longer representing
them onstage in the form of phrases, and instead simply presenting them––
somehow more literally––through a single ongoing task.
This is where I notice significant overlap with flamenco music and dance,
which in the structured improvisation performance format of tablao flamenco,
also performs emotional management in real time. Rather than choreographically
“position[ing] the viewer as a self-conscious subject in relation to the experience
of viewing and reading the dance,” as the minimalist work of Rainer and Morris
did, flamenco performances present for the audience an actual moment of
musical collaboration––an encounter between musicians and dancer (Burt 78).
This adds an additional nodal point in the circulation of energy in a given
performance, positioning the dancer in between two contrasting sets of gazes––
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which can have an effect of somehow pressurizing the movement. With regards
to emotions themselves, these conditions have been described as rendering
imagined feelings so intensely visible to viewers that they personify them––
naming them as if they were real humans, or else, spirits moving around the
room, or even possessing the dancer. In the next chapter, I will consider the
ways in which flamenco has been described as a highly expressive art form,
along these figurative lines. But before then, I would like to finish this chapter by
painting one last, impressionistic picture of the influence of postmodern dance
artists on Sensaciones y emociones.
***
Recall that my desire to feel better and my conviction that my feelings are
hard to talk about eventually became three discrete emotions, which then
became three dances. Coaxing these feelings toward materiality was strange
labor––something like entering an imaginary relationship with each one. Dancing
each day with all three of them, I slowly began feeling less and less like myself. I
turned to the writing of several postmodern dancers as one would defer to an
advice column. The most helpful to me were Steve Paxton and Deborah Hay.
I spent several weeks hardly moving. On this, Paxton describes the
development of contact improvisation as a search for images: “In recognizing that
we do not begin from zero, that we first have to have a desire or image to launch
the system into action, I decided that I had to work in the area of images, though
cautiously. The images were to be, well, ‘real’” (176). I wanted real images so
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badly that––for forty minutes every day––I imagined myself kneeling in a pile of
flowers, until I realized just how expensive this would be to stage. I looked a little
closer at what Paxton meant when he said that “as the right kind of images were
found, a working model began to emerge in my mind” and that “in the working
model, events of the emotions and disorientations […] were considered to be
symptomatic that the senses were not quite ready to report what was happening
to the consciousness, that instead they were reporting to the reflexive part of the
mind and body” (178; 180). I was disoriented and experiencing emotional events
each day, but I knew I was working. One day I looked up and saw that I had
unwittingly written on the chalk board: I will not use these feelings to punish
myself, I will not use the idea of work to punish myself, and in my notebook: I am
using these feelings to distract myself from the task at hand. These were
thoughts I had never consciously thought before, but that were reported by my
senses directly to my mind and body. I prayed for patience and asked myself “to
become an observer of the sensations and to work calmly on each emotional,
orientational, or habitual block as it arose” (Paxton 181). I started meditating, and
began studying when and where I block my own breath to prevent myself from
feeling––intentional “gap[s] of consciousness” (Paxton 177). I became quite
familiar with the fact that “the consciousness can travel inside the body” and, as
Paxton also offers, that “it is analogous to focusing eyes in the external world”
(177). Not breathing, I finally realized, is like walking around with one’s eyes
closed. I got acquainted with my insides until I found sensations. Then, I finally

70
decided to call the concert Sensaciones y emociones when I learned from
Paxton that “sensations are what we feel to be happening at the moment, and
they can become images when we take notice that we are observing them”
(182). When I finally found the three sensations, I observed them and named
them in my notebook, and that’s when I knew I was feeling better. I started
moving. Soon after they were images, they became dances. I immediately knew
what I wanted to wear. Paxton offered that “first we feel the movements, then we
can objectify the feelings into images” and I agree; this was more or less how it
all happened (Paxton 182).
Then, to state it too simply, it was from Deborah Hay that I learned that––
in this project––the explicit goal was to “abandon holding onto the shape of me”
(2). In Using the Sky: a Dance, Hay asks: “Without the words to describe it, what
if your audience senses these shifting boundaries of your body?” (20). My prayer
was to be so boundary-less that “I” would disappear. And so, I borrowed her
notion of prayer for all the praying I did. She writes:
Praying arose in the same manner as my other dance exercises. I am
alone dancing and for a few moments my body is caught in an aching
sense of depth and connection. I want to know I can revisit here, and so
the desire to articulate my experience momentarily replaces the dancing.
With pen in hand, I sit and record what I believe my body is recreating
for my conscious mind. It is usually a single thought, in the form of a
paradox, or a riddle. I then construct a network of conditions which guide
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my approach to examining the riddle or thought. Not in search of an
answer, I kinesthetically gather evidence from the feedback. After several
months to a year of practice, I can sensually embody the riddle or thought
without having to deconstruct it first. (Hay 55)
For example, my favorite of these is the riddle that Hay sensually
embodied in her work in 1987: “I imagine every cell in my body has the potential
to perceive wisdom every moment, while remaining positionless about what
wisdom is or what it looks like” (103). Once I found three paradoxical sensations
of my own, I wrote them down as riddles––impossible tasks in the future tense––
to inspire the three ongoing practices that became three dances over time. It is
strange to see them typed, but they were:
1) I will use this feeling to get closer to you;
2) I will surrender to this feeling;
3) This feeling is behind me and no longer exists; I will go searching for it.
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Chapter Four
A history: flamenco, passionate feeling, and extra-expression
In this chapter, I will draw a connection between one more branch of
recent research on emotion and a trend I have noticed in historical descriptions
of flamenco––the personification or anthropomorphism of emotions themselves.
By looking closely at the stereotypical image of flamenco dancers as performers
of passionate feelings, I will describe how the extravagantly expressive, or extraexpressive, reputation of the dance form was another avenue into the notion of
non-expression for me in this project.
I will also notice that the opportunity to perform a feeling of feelings
beyond the expressive norms is one way that flamenco provides (and has
provided) its practitioners with ways of reiteratively moving beyond the self, as it
is standardly imagined. This opportunity was capitalized upon as flamenco took
shape as a performance genre. I will describe how, in watching all of this
extravagant expression, viewers frequently attested to seeing not only the
movement of dancers, but of feelings themselves, as well. This was emotion so
intense and visible that it could never originate in or belong to a feeling subject
proper, and instead, was often imagined as something like a magical spirit itself–
–for example, duende, or more broadly, a passion. I will call the performance
practices that took shape around this rampant, Romantic figuration: extraexpression. My goal is to once again arrive at these observations by looking
closely at bodies expressing themselves through practiced ways of moving, and
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to suggest my own relationship with these ideas and practices as a student of
flamenco. I will finish this chapter with a brief description of the three dances I
performed in Sensaciones y emociones.
***
The branch of research I mention above, as summarized by the historian
William Reddy, is conducted largely by historians and literary critics who focus
on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These scholars “trace the rise and
fall of an emotional revolution of the past, called ‘sentimentalism,’ or the ‘cult of
sensibility’––a loosely organized set of impulses that played a role in cultural
currents as diverse as Methodism, antislavery agitation, the rise of the novel, the
French Revolution (including the Terror), and the birth of Romanticism” (Reddy
x). The influence of this revolution––and particularly the birth of Romanticism––
on dance history, as well as on the origins of flamenco as a performance genre,
cannot be overstated. As the editors of Flamenco on the Global Stage:
Historical, Critical and Theoretical Perspectives mention in their introduction: “In
our view, the strategies of auto-exoticization and exploiting one’s own negative
or ambivalent image, like the fictitious image of the Gitano, lie at the heart of the
formation of flamenco in the context of nineteenth-century Romanticism”
(Bennahum et al. 11; my emphasis). Furthermore, they alertly draw attention to
those scholars––such as Luis Lavaur and Rocío Plaza Orellana––who have
written theories and histories of flamenco that regard the art form to be
something of a direct response to Romanticism.
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Central to flamenco’s history, then, has been a set of performance
practices that were directly tied to a cultural shift in attitude toward feeling itself,
and that were, as the flamenco scholar Cristina Cruces-Roldán notes,
“operational from the moment flamenco was born as performance” (210). She
details that it is largely through the dance form’s two key aesthetic
dimorphisms––masculine–feminine and Gitano–non-Gitano––that these
practices are performed. She writes: “the romantic opposition of ‘body-emotionfemininity’ vs. ‘mind-reason-masculinity’ was systematized as a basic duality in
the emergent sexual division of flamenco labor (Cruces-Roldán 215). The voice
and music were (and largely still are) the “jurisdiction of men” in flamenco
practice, while “the criteria of hypercorporeality condemned women to using
their bodies as the ultimate frontier of art and professionalism” (Cruces-Roldán
215). In my experiences, the feminine de cintura para arriba techniques for
crafting and displaying emotion in the upper-body alone, detailed by CrucesRoldán in this essay, are still widely taught and performed in flamenco today.
This convention operates in conjunction with a range of other coded and
practiced movement conventions that feed into this division of labor, such as
the association of the virtuosic, rhythm-based footwork improvisation with men,
the traditional feminine costume (described by Cruces-Roldán as “symbolizing
an anxious expressive overload”), and the tradition of male dancers performing
the final act in tablao performances (216).
Meanwhile, the other, Romantic dimorphism at play in flamenco are those
practices which perform a “‘hyperracialized’ Gitano flamenco aesthetic” wherein

75
“the body acquires a capacity for action […] that bets on spontaneity,
radicalism, defiance, intuition, baroque style, and chaos” (Cruces-Roldán 219).
These movement qualities also function as stereotypical character traits of the
gitano––a racial minority in Spain––whose largely fictionalized image and history
was exploited and reiteratively performed to feed a prevalent desire for exotic
performances of otherness in nineteenth-century Europe. Cruces-Roldán
comments that “flamenco found a place onstage as a new musical and artistic
system, a new model, a new commercial code, attractive to those who wished
to pay admission” in partial response to these Romantic cravings for intense
feeling as purchasable commodity (212). This is not to say that flamenco
practitioners and their emotional performances were affected, in the sense that
the feelings were somehow fake. But it is to say that these performances of
feelings were highly affective––put into motion by stereotypical imagery,
socioeconomic marginalization, and a growing bourgeois consumer market and
their desires. Of course, then, the feelings that were appearing on the stages of
the new cafés cantantes in the nineteenth century were coming just as much
from without as within.
Furthermore, the Orientalist character of all this commodification and
trade is perhaps best underscored by the fact that, even before the
institutionalization of flamenco performance in the Spanish cafés cantantes,
there was a tradition of European tourism throughout the nineteenth century to
the countries of the Islamic Mediterranean––Syria, Egypt, and Algeria––precisely
to watch a variety of all-female “Gypsy” performance in dance cafes. This
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tourism was especially popular amongst Romantic writers, including the French
novelist Alexandre Dumas. This history is told with great finesse by Ninotchka
Devorah Bennahum in Carmen, a Gypsy Geography, in which she summarizes
that “the solo female Gypsy performer in North Africa and southern Spain
fulfilled the French and British intellectuals’ quest for the inner Orient, the
spiritual Orient, and archetypal female presence that allows foreigners the
mythopoetic right of return to self via the Holy Land, as if they, like Gypsies,
once belonged” (143). Commenting on a similar myth––the fantastical notion
that female Spanish dancers are descendant of the infamously lascivious,
dancing puellae gaditane of the Roman empire––historian Kathy Milazzo
reminds us that “myths are discourse, either written or spoken. They seek to
elicit emotions rather than offer facts” (40). The appetite for emotions
themselves, in other words, has often been enough to imagine and mythologize
Spanish dance beyond what is actually to be seen in these dances, or factually
true.
***
For the sake of being as direct as possible, here are five descriptions of
Spanish dance. In each, there is telling use of figurative language, varying in
nature from allegory to personification. The first is from the renowned, 19th
century dance theorist and ballet master, Carlo Blasis:
[The Spanish dances] represent the generous sentiment of an absolute
protection of the object beloved, at other times they describe with vivacity
the tender feeling it inspires, and the sincerity of the avowal. […] The
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agitation of the body, the footing, the postures, the attitudes, the
waverings, whether they be lively or dull, are the representatives of desire,
of gallantry, of impatience, of uncertainty, of tenderness, of chagrin, of
confusion, of despair, of revival, of satisfaction and, finally, of happiness.
(ctd. in Jeschke 99).
The second is from the French novelist Alexandre Dumas who––as Bennahum
notes––in this moment romantically conflates the Spanish Orient with the Syrian
Orient, as he describes how Spanish “dancing is a joy to the dancer herself”:
She delights in every toss of her head, every flicker of her hands. Her feet
spurn the ground, she whinnies with excitement and the magnetic current
of her passion streams out to galvanize every man who watches her…the
Gypsy Orient is produced for him…the delirious joy of fifty or sixty
Spaniards applauding a dancer in the upper room of a café in Seville! (ctd.
in Bennahum 148)
The third is from the flamencologist Gerhard Steingress, who here cites the
canonical flamenco dancer Antonio Gades on his flamenco choreography of the
opera Carmen. Steingress apparently works here to distill the essence of
flamenco as an art form:
But the image [i.e., of Carmen] does not necessarily depict a prostitute, as
one might imagine, for the dance is not simple seduction. Beyond
seduction, we remember Gades’s words, “is to squeeze out feeling
through movement, and anyone can do that.” In other words, his Carmen
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could also do that. To express feeling in public, to share private sentiment,
and even to pretend emotion in order to produce duende (the magic of
flamenco), that is art. The tablao (flamenco club) was born out of this
impulse, and Gades understood how to broaden, transposing it for the
concert stage […]. (119)
The fourth is from a 1781 poster announcing a Gypsy performance in a tavern in
Lebrija, cited by Cristina Cruces-Roldán. As she notes, the poster appeared
several decades before “flamenco existed as a named form of performance”
(Cruces-Roldán 218). The poster read: “‘El demonio duerme en el cuerpo de las
gitanas y se despierta con la zarabanda.’ (The devil sleeps in the bodies of the
Gypsy women and wakes with the zarabanda)” (Cruces-Roldán 218).
And the final description comes from the Spanish poet, playwright, and
flamenco enthusiast Federico García Lorca. In his essay “Play and Theory of the
Duende,” Lorca writes: “The great artists of the south of Spain, whether Gypsy or
flamenco, whether they sing, dance, or play, know that no emotion is possible
unless the duende comes” (60). He goes on to provide an example of duende
coming to the canonical flamenco singer Pastora Pavón, La Niña de los Peines,
who after being heckled for an uninspired performance one evening apparently
resorted to summoning the spirit. Lorca writes:
As though crazy, torn like a medieval mourner, La Niña de los Peines
leaped to her feet, tossed off a big glass of burning liquor, and began to
sing with a scorched throat: without voice, without breath or color, but with
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duende. She was able to kill all the scaffolding of the song and leave way
for a furious, enslaving duende, friend of sand winds, who made the
listeners rip their clothes […]. (Lorca 61)
To preface this brief discussion of the figure of duende: I have studied with
Spanish flamenco artists my entire life, and not one of the has ever invoked
duende––neither the notion, nor the spirit itself––in his or her instruction.
Whether this image has lost popularity in recent years, or is only in circulation
outside of the flamenco community, or is reserved for the most sacred of
flamenco conversations to which I have not been privy, I am not certain.
Regardless, if seen as a rhetorical device that became “a cornerstone of
[Lorca’s] poetics” precisely as “Lorca’s poetry was turning away from the logic of
traditional metaphor to images which attempt to evade rational analysis,” its
presence here begins to make more sense (Maurer vii; ix). Lorca, inspired by his
experiences as an influential patron of the art form, frequently worked to defend
the marginalized, Gypsy performance genre of flamenco to the white Spanish
aristocracy. In my view, Lorca thus imagined and crafted the figure of duende, a
spirit that functions much like the muse or the angel has––to supernaturally
inspire artmaking––in order to figuratively mediate the “hyperracial” performance
aesthetic of flamenco song and dance. This is a complicated, poetic effort and
there is a lot going on here. What is important, however, is that when Lorca says
that “the duende works on the body of the dancer as the wind works on sand,” he
is personifying that which is usually imagined to move a flamenco dancer. The
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feeling that she would otherwise be passionately expressing––perhaps the “devil”
inside her awakened by music, moving her to expression through dance––is now
the spirit of duende. Lorca describes the dance itself as an altered state, of being
influenced from without. Therefore, when he claims that he once “heard an old
maestro of the guitar say, ‘the duende is not in the throat; the duende climbs up
inside you, from the soles of the feet,” he describes the art form in such a way
that it takes on a new appearance to an outside eye (Lorca 57). The dancer’s
feelings themselves become visible, as her motion is now commotion––the work
of a wild spirit.
Once again, feelings imagined this way are hardly self-expressive. They
do not originate from within a feeling subject, but are signs of a body’s
possession by duende himself. They come from beyond the body, and move that
body into expressive action. And as Lorca suggests, “the duende’s arrival always
means a radical change in forms” (62). Flamenco thus becomes freshly
commoditized as an extra-expressive, hyperracial, and hypercorporeal art form,
wherein the exotic bodies of the performers are animated by forces beyond
human comprehension, and wherein feelings are no longer quiet, internal
belongings, but are spectacle in their own right––flying around the room, crawling
up through the feet from the inside of the earth. Furthermore, when framed as
one of Lorca’s many efforts to sell the marginalized art form to encourage
patronage, duende can himself be seen as something of a performing body––
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one of the many bodies performing on the flamenco stage––“selling it,” as they
say.
Lorca’s duende figure is not alone, however, as can be sensed in the
other four descriptions of Spanish dance, as well. This trend in allegorizing,
objectifying, anthropomorphizing, or totally personifying a Spanish dancer’s
emotions in performance suggest the wide-reaching influence of Orientalist and
Romantic imaginative desire on the image of flamenco––both as it is perceived
and described. And as I have suggested throughout the essay, the way an
emotion is imagined often has direct influence on how that emotion is performed
through practiced movement, which can give shape to a dance form, in turn.
What each of these descriptions work to do is account for what is to be seen in
flamenco dance––extravagant ways of moving beyond the expressive norms in
other dance forms in that era, extreme physical effort and concentration, a
performance of letting-loose or coming-undone that steadily builds in energetic
intensity, spontaneous improvisation, excess in costume and volume,
hypercorporeality and hyperraciality. In this sense, these accounts strove to
match the tone and texture of expressivity perceived in flamenco performance
through figurative language. How else would one use words to say he saw
emotion itself onstage last night? That is, in being notoriously difficult phenomena
to perceive and describe, it is no surprise that poets, novelists, academics,
theorists, and tavern owners alike have banded together in their approach to the
challenging task of naming feelings.
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***
Of the research that looks to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century cultural
production for signs of a great shift in emotional attitude, I was most drawn to the
work of the scholar of English literature, Adela Pinch. In Strange Fits of Passion:
Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen, Pinch characterizes this shift in
attitude as epistemological in nature––driven by a desire to know what feelings
are and where they come from––and that “the eighteenth century’s revolution in
epistemology, which both gave feeling empirical origins and declared their social
benefits, had strange effects on how writers represented people’s relations to
their feelings” (7). She looks to works of philosophy and literature alike. Despite
the Romantic image of emotion as stemming from one’s individuality, Pinch
notices “the period’s concomitant tendency to characterize feelings as
transpersonal, as autonomous entities that do not always belong to individuals
but rather wander extravagantly from one person to another” (3). As such, Pinch
discusses the “emotional extravagance” of writing about feeling in this period in
two senses: that feeling was seen to “stray beyond boundaries” of the individual
in nomadic patterns and that feeling was often depicted in scenes of excess,
lavishness, sentimentality, and generally, without restraint.
Crucially, she observes that “feelings in late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century writing appear most excessive when that writing raises
questions about whom these feelings belong to, about whether those feelings
come from without or from within a person” (Pinch 4). Of course, this is the period
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in which flamenco appears as a performance genre––as the professionalized
staging of similar extravagance and excess through song and dance, and no
less, in a Spanish style. It would be a vast misrepresentation of flamenco,
however, to argue that this effort was solely for commercial gain. Pinch’s work
here assists in drawing the connection that flamenco was part of wider, cultural
inquiry into the nature of emotions themselves, in the very same era as “the rise
of individualism and the construction of the subject” and wherein the dance’s
extravagance and excess mark its very participation in this inquiry (13).
Therefore, when Pinch writes “the history of feeling and the history of the
individual are not the same thing,” I am encouraged to look to flamenco as a
performance practice that worked to “authorize and authenticate those feelings”
that were being intentionally imagined throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries as separate from the human individual and autonomous in their own
right (13). Of course, the history of feeling and the history of the individual
eventually became conflated, as has been discussed at length in this essay. We
struggle today to imagine emotions as distinct from the human individual from
whom we believe they originate, and to whom we contend they belong.
Furthermore, Pinch considers the role of personification in the eighteenthand nineteenth-century epistemological drive to know feelings, asking “what it
means to represent feelings as persons” and as she works to “reveal the
assumptions this practice implies about the knowability both of feelings and of
the concept of ‘person’” (Pinch 8; Pinch 8). While she turns her attention to a
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much discussed, rather personal-seeming confession of bad feelings in the
philosopher David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature to argue her points,
Pinch’s fascinating analysis of this moment relates to my own interest in the of
personification of feelings.
I have already noticed in descriptions of flamenco, just as Pinch suggests
here, that “personifications of emotions––figures of intense feeling that may
belong to no real person––reveal the extent to which the knowability of emotions
themselves may depend on rhetorical forms” (21). That is, figurative language
plays an instrumental role in rendering an encounter with a hypercorporeal and
hyperracial Other––the dancing Gypsy––knowable at all, particularly in visual
terms. The movement itself becomes visible (or at least, visually recognizable
and describable) precisely as the feelings that inspire that movement are
personified. Pinch summarizes that this act of “communication of feeling from
one person to another, from writer to reader, is facilitated by bodying forth feeling
in the form of a person” (47; my emphasis). That is, the intense, performed
feelings of the body of another person are most knowable in the form of an
additional imagined body or person. My sense is that, upon seeing feelings as
they appear in flamenco performance––without representational or narrative
elements, performed by a marginalized, racial Other, created through the
immediate collaboration between dancers and musicians––viewers “can’t do
without the category of the person” in order to describe what they see, or at the
very least, the category of the supernatural spirit (Pinch 48). As Pinch explains,
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“if feelings seem detached from actual persons, the notion of a bounded, selfdisclosed entity for feeling seems indispensable” (48).
Feelings can be hard to see, describe, and know, especially those
attributed to an exotic body. An additional body, imaginatively bodied forth,
helpfully mediates a challenging encounter––it is a body I have created myself, in
precisely the form that I wish to imagine it, standing in between me and the
foreign body dancing before my own eyes. Pinch states that “personification thus
can both stabilize and clarify the notion of the person and present us with
feelings in knowable form” precisely in that the personification is one’s own
creation––a crafted image drawn from the viewer’s own existing knowledge or
imagination (48). To clarify is often to re-present a challenging idea in already
known terms. And in dance practice, stabilization is often how we allow for the
mobility of the another body part, such as when the right leg works to stabilize so
that the left is then mobile, and free to gesture. The viewer himself feels mobile
again upon describing the dancing Other in a way that aligns with his own sense
of what feeling is; he has made sense of things, things that otherwise baffle.
Personification thus re-establishes equilibrium after the disorienting experience of
encountering feelings themselves in motion, moving other bodies, by way of
performance in real time.
***
I sense that when Adela Pinch offers that “to personify a feeling […] is in a
significant sense an impersonal way of expressing a feeling” in that “it removes

86
the feeling from the subject who presumably feels it and gives the feeling the
autonomy of a person,” she is noticing in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
literary practices something that became coded into the practices of flamenco
music and dance, as well (45; 46). To a large extent, this is why I felt so at home
using my practice and training as a flamenco dancer to re-imagine the notion of
self-expression in Sensaciones y emociones. While the troubling of selfexpression in the modern dance tradition was deemed formalist, postmodern,
anti-expressive, or no longer dance at all, my feeling is that there has been a
certain amount of space for this work in flamenco since its very inception.
On the one hand, flamenco practitioners have long been viewed as extraexpressive bodies whose feelings are so extravagant in performance that they
are seen as something more like passion than emotion proper––that is, when
they are not fully personified. Passions can be impersonal or depersonalized
feelings, autonomously wandering from body to body, animating individuals into
action. To be a passionate feeler, then, is to be constantly overcome by feeling,
and this is hardly the authored, self-expressive creative act of a choreographer
who communicates feeling through dance. On the other hand, in my experiences
of flamenco practice, I have noticed that matters of feeling are often considered
secondary to matters of listening, relating to, and honoring the music. This
prioritized effort is seen as requiring total presence in the collaborative moment
of making flamenco performance; feeling happens, to be sure, but only as a
consequence of the act of attending fully to the live creation of music.
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Furthermore, there is no one, given person on the stage expressing himself in
any moment of flamenco performance––not the dancer, the singer, the guitarist,
nor the palmeros. The moment, and whatever feelings it holds, is shared; as
such, the feelings feel impersonal, in the sense that I never feel them to originate
in me nor belong to me alone. They are in circulation, bouncing from wall to wall,
feelings themselves. Even when I dance alone in silence before the music
begins, for example, I feel the presence of the musicians behind me, and that
very feeling gives shape to my dance. Even without recourse to the music for
inspiration or animation, I am energetically not moving alone.
For that reason, the verb transmitir (to transmit) appears much more often
with regards to emotion in flamenco pedagogy and practice than the verb
expresar (to express). In fact, the canonical flamenco singer José Monge Cruz
(Camarón de la Isla) was known to say “El flamenco no tiene más que una
escuela, transmitir o no transmitir” ––flamenco has only one school: to transmit
or not transmit (ctd. in Viana n.p.). That is, the skillful transmission of emotion
from one nodal point to another (dancer to singer, stage to audience, teacher to
student) is how feeling is mobilized in flamenco performance, or perhaps, how it
is imagined. It is a matter of successfully freeing emotions, transmitting them by
aiding their travel. In my experiences, however, this work is very real feeling;
when dancing well, I literally experience emotions pass by me, fly through me,
envelop me, dance nearby. Sometimes, I feel these feelings specifically by way
of the music, which I hear inside me, outside of me, everywhere. This movement
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of feelings requires complete presence of mind to fully notice, and complete
presence of body to fully respond to with one’s own movement. And because
there are other people involved in these circulations of feeling, the work also
demands rather honed social skills––a certain amicability, and indeed, a
willingness to move beyond one’s self.
I was inspired to try my hand at choreographing non-expressions precisely
because of these experiences throughout my flamenco practice, in which I have
perceived the movement of feelings, but then have all too often felt myself
moving in ways that did not complement the movement of those feelings, at all. I
sensed that a sort of total movement––of my body and of the feelings themselves
alongside each other––could be jointly choreographed somehow, and that this
could only be done if I silenced the impulse to express those feelings in any way.
I believed that if I were to truly experience the feelings as feelings themselves, I
could not imagine them into existence. Instead, they would have to arrive in my
practice over time. For that reason––in the two evenings of performance––I
called the first twenty minutes of Sensaciones y emociones the “Llegada”
(Arrival). As the audience arrived, so did the feelings, while I knelt onstage and
waited for them to move me. The whole experience had humbled me to my
knees, and I had spent most of the summer prior in prayer, so I felt that my knees
was where I belonged, at least until I was moved to my feet.
In the three dances that followed, I presented three choreographic models
of the movement of three feelings themselves. I got acquainted with this
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movement by moving my own body under their influence, and as I set movement
material, the feelings gave that material its shape. In this way, the dances were
something like three-dimensional diagrams of the feelings and their movement,
and so I called them choreographic models. At certain moments in this process, I
felt myself to be interacting with the feelings, or even manipulating them. But I
think that the work was most successful when I intervened as little as possible,
and the material became set largely through repetition––by repeatedly moving
with the feeling each day until it solidified into something three-dimensional and
memorable, in that it re-appeared day to day. To say I choreographed the dances
feels, well, not quite right.
For example, in one of the dances, I directly transcribed the movement of
another body onto my own body from video footage, in an attempt to feel feelings
that I had never quite felt before, because they were feelings from the past. In
another part of that dance, I sought movement from my own body’s memory in
order to summon a particular feeling from my own past: a certain flavor of
pleasure that I have known but that I couldn’t remember at that time. Then, at the
end of that dance, I let a feeling walk through me and then walk away, right out of
the room, such that if I ever wanted to have that feeling again––God forbid––I
would have to choose to go after it. It was an awful feeling, but neither did it
come from me, nor did it ever belong to me, and I haven’t quite known it since.
Vicente Griego, the singer, sang a cabal for this part of the dance, whose lyrics
tragically read:

90
Abráme la tierra
que me quiero morir
que pa vivir
como yo estoy viviendo
prefiero morir.
This was the last dance in Sensaciones y emociones, and it was a dance in three
parts: “Interludio,” “Martinete de Antonio Ruíz Soler el Bailarín,” and “Cabal.”
Recall that the riddle for this dance was: This feeling is behind me and no longer
exists; I will go searching for it.
In the first two dances in the concert, however, I performed flamenco
alongside four other flamenco artists, in order to collaborate toward feeling in real
time. The first dance came directly out of the kneeling––a practice born of
imagining myself kneeling in flowers––and that took the shape of a few letras of
bulerías de Cadíz, which I danced to while sitting on a bench. In this dance, I was
modelling how it feels when, for example, dough is rolled out to soften it––or the
way it feels when something spreads and, in spreading, comes closer to you,
even if it hasn’t exactly moved. The riddle for this dance was: I will use this
feeling to get closer to you. To use even vaguer language: I was also dancing the
sensation of through-ness, particularly in the heart space of my body, as well as
the sensation of “Against all agony a bunch of flowers in the chest” and of
course, the sensations of bulerías de Cadíz (Notley 178). I wore crimson colored
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pants and a white t-shirt, and it was in this dance (twenty-five minutes into the
show) that I was finally able to stand up.
In the second dance, I changed into sage green colored pants and a black
shirt while Vicente Griego sang me a letra of cartagenera. After that, I danced
two letras of tarantos; then was joined by my father and my aunt, and we danced
a few letras of tangos together. The riddle for this dance was: I will surrender to
this feeling. I found that sensation of surrender by experimenting with the
horizontal plane, by back-bending, and by working with a sensation of daughterness. I have never been a daughter before, but I watched several hours of videos
of the classic female flamenco dancers––Matilde Coral, Milagros Mengíbar,
Carmen Mora, Merche Esmeralda––dancing por taranto. I noticed a certain look
in their eyes that I named daughter-ness; I wanted to surrender and look that
way, too, even if that’s a feeling that may never be mine. Tonally, tarantos are a
rather unique flamenco song form; I find the music rather special. I worked,
sometimes for hours at a time, to change the tone of my muscles to match this
special tono de taranto. I would do push-ups, then stand with my arms above my
head and look out into space until I couldn’t any more. I also worked to
understand what a teacher of mine, La Popi, meant when she told me that she
feels taranto to be terrenal (earthly). This came by yielding and surrendering to
the space around me, feeling it as if it were the earth underneath me when lying
on the floor, and this is how the dance took shape.
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The last thing to mention in this closing description is that, when watching
footage of the final performance of the concert, I noticed––among many other
things––that I danced much of the night with my mouth open. In all this work, I
was embarrassingly slack-jawed, as if breathing heavily, as if aghast or in awe,
as if a child asleep in the backseat of the car, as if I had never seen someone
perform dance before! I felt such remorse over this until I remembered the first
time I contact improvised with someone. That person was so engaged in the
feeling of sensations that they moved with their mouth ajar the entire time. As we
moved together, in and out of contact, I went in and out of feeling judgmental of
such an ugly countenance, until I eased in and, I’m sure, let my mouth fall open
as well. The judgement was just another feeling; it came and it went. Just as we
breathe in and out of our mouths when we aren’t thinking about it, this essay has
worked to describe how our feelings travel inwards and outwards, in all
directions, entering us and escaping us––as soon as we allow their autonomous
movement. Sometimes so much feeling is being felt in all this that one forgets to
keep their mouth shut. Early on in the work of feeling feelings in this new way, it
was easy to forget.
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Conclusion
By way of conclusion, I would like to suggest the next steps that this

essay would take––if it were a dance that lasted longer than it need last, or if it
were a dancer that just kept spinning and spinning. Hopefully, this articulation
will also have impact on future performances of Sensaciones y emociones,
which I intend to significantly revise and re-work after the experience of writing
this dissertation.
First, one of my initial intentions in this essay was to provide a fuller
description of the choreographic methods that I practiced in making this
concert, which are deeply influenced by the dancer and pedagogue, Chrysa
Parkinson. Early in the research, however, I decided to give considerable time
and effort to what was, for me, the investigation of new ideas, as opposed to
those that are already imbricated within my existing practice. I sense that a
description of my choreographic and working methods would necessarily rely
on close description and analysis of the footage of the concert itself, in turn.
Unfortunately, this work was significantly overshadowed by the conceptual
groundwork and historical positioning researched in this essay. Here, I would
like to note that Robin Nelson cites this exact problem as one of the most
common in his advisement of practice-as-research PhD dissertations, wherein
the practitioner-researcher submits an inquiry that “has been identified but on a
grander scale than the project will bear. Most often this is the result of a lack of
understanding that practical inquiry is just as valid as theoretical, or a lack of
confidence […] in the praxis” (81). Referring to a choreographic project that
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became overwhelmed by an engagement with post-classical physics, Nelson
continues: “What I wish to clarify through this example is the institutional
research need for the arts praxis to have the capacity to undertake an inquiry
which yields insights of its own, not just to claim resonance by analogy with
ideas circulating in another domain” (81).
In my own work going forward, I intend to cultivate confidence in the rigor
and insightfulness of my own practice. While I benefitted significantly from the
type of research I undertook in the writing of this dissertation, I see the ways in
which I could have taken a different course of action. This course––to state it
simply––would have looked more closely and specifically at the work that I
staged in Sensaciones y emociones, analyzing not only the choreographic, but
also, the dramaturgical choices that went into its production. Many of these
choices were decidedly queer in nature; this iteration of the essay would have
turned to queer theory, as opposed to affect theory, for its conceptual
framework. Furthermore, a more practice-oriented iteration of this essay would
have provided a more thorough description and analysis of the flamenco in the
concert––explicating the collaborative musical choices that consumed the
majority of my energy as choreographer. It is difficult to discuss flamenco
practice without conducting research in Spanish, and in turn, without
painstakingly offering explanation for all of the genre’s complexities and
traditions––by way of a greater act of translation. I avoided this labor, but upon
reflection, I see how the essay lacks a certain amount of translation entirely, and
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even in moments when translation (or close description and explication) may
have been necessary.
I have also been encouraged by my dissertation committee to indicate in
this conclusion that the research I present in this essay is unprecedented in
flamenco scholarship. My sense is that this may be true, because this project
engages with flamenco via practice-as-research methodologies. But I will also
say here that––even in my earliest, stumbling descriptions of this project to other
flamenco practitioners––I heard back several pues, claro, hijo’s. In other words,
the findings that I offer in this essay are not unprecedented, simply unarticulated
in scholarly discourse. The practitioners with whom I have discussed this project
indicate that this way of thinking––and the knowledge it produces––is already
familiar to them.
And finally, it is not too late to share a few last words on the notion of
expression. Soon after I finished drafting this essay, I found the choreographer
Mette Ingvartsen’s “Yes Manifesto” from 2005. The “Yes Manifesto” is
seemingly a direct response to Yvonne Rainer’s infamous “No Manifesto” from
1965, in which Rainer articulated many of her so-called anti-expressionist
beliefs. Ingvartsen’s manifesto is short enough to reproduce in full below;
however, I will draw attention to the fact that it says “Yes to expression.” This
“yes”––which I think must be read in the context of the rest of manifesto to be
understood––reminds me that my own fascination with expression stems from
the fact that I feel myself do it quite often. I perceive feelings travelling beyond
the very boundaries of my person when I dance, nearly every day; it is an
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emotional experience that is hard to ignore. Oftentimes I even encourage the
feelings in this direction. I let them out. The point, however, as suggested here
by Ingvartsen, is to give this experience a new name. And once expression has
a new name, I intend to say “yes” to it again, too:
Yes to redefining virtuosity
Yes to conceptualizing experience, affects, sensation
Yes to materiality/body practice
Yes to investment of performer and spectator
Yes to expression
Yes to excess
Yes to ‘invention’ (however impossible)
Yes to un-naming, decoding and recoding expression
Yes to non-recognition, non-resemblance
Yes to non-sense/illogic
Yes to organizing principles rather than fixed logic systems
Yes to move the ‘clear concept’ behind the actual performance of
Yes to methodology and procedures
Yes to editing and animation
Yes to style as a result of a proposal
Yes to multiplicity and difference. (Ingvartsen 48)
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Appendix A
The UNIVERSITY of NEW MEXICO
DEPARTMENT of THEATRE and DANCE presents
SENSACIONES y EMOCIONES
MFA in DANCE
THESIS CONCERT
MARTES y MIÉRCOLES
el 5 y 6 de SEPTIEMBRE
2017

1. LLEGADA 2. BULERÍAS de CADÍZ
3. CARTAGENERA, TARANTOS, y TANGOS
4. INTERLUDIO 5. MARTINETE de ANTONIO RUÍZ SOLER el BAILARÍN
6. CABAL

Coreografía: NEVAREZ ENCINIAS
Cante: VICENTE GRIEGO
Toque: RICARDO ANGLADA y MARIO FEBRES
Baile: NEVAREZ, MARISOL y JOAQUÍN ENCINIAS
Directora de escena: JULIA YOUNGS
Diseño y operadora de luces: LOUISE BROWNE
Operador del sonido: ELOY GONZALES
Directores técnicos: TOM MONACO, BILL LIOTTA, y RICHARD HESS
Tramoyistas: JOELLE STRICKLAND, SOPHIA BROUSSARD, ANDREW VILLANUEVA, ARIS ZAFFER, PRISCILLA
GOMEZ, DANE HOPKINS, y los TANM TOROS
Proyección: BRIAN FEJER
Dibujo del cartel: ZAHRA MARWAN
Diseño del cartel: McKENNA GRIER
Grabado del cartel: HOLLIS MOORE
Vestuario: ANA SANCHEZ, EVA ENCINIAS, y BRENDA GRIER
Con gran respeto y admiración a los siguientes artistas flamencos, cuyos pasos estudio en estos bailes: Claudia
Cruz, Lucía la Piñona Álvarez, Olga Pericet, Valeriano Paños y Rafael Estevez, Maria Moreno, Rosario Toledo,
Anabel Moreno, Matilde Coral, Milagros Mengíbar, Carmen Mora, Merche Esmeralda, Eva la Yerbabuena,
Daniel Navarro, Javier Latorre, Concha Jareño, Belén López, Alejandro Granados, Pedro Córdoba, Nino de los
Reyes y Triana Maciel, Agueda Saavedra, Iván Vargas, Adriana Santana, Tacha González, Inmaculada Aranda,
Antonio Canales, y Marco Flores.
I would like to express the immense gratitude I feel to my family and friends, who are guiding me through this
experience with incredible generosity. I would particularly like to thank my grandmother, Eva Encinias, and my
mother, Brenda Grier, who have believed in me as I worked this summer. I am grateful to all of my teachers,
as well, and especially to my great-grandmother, my grandmother, my father, and my aunt, who have given
me my life’s great blessing. I hope so deeply to honor them through this work. I would like to thank Vicente
Griego, Mario Febres, and Ricardo Anglada for their beautiful music and friendship, and for the example of
their devotion to our art. I’m also grateful for the support I have received from the technicians working on this
project, who have received me and my ideas with patience and kindness. I am greatly indebted to Amanda
Hamp, Donna Jewell, Mary Anne Santos Newhall, Vladimir Conde Reche, Dominika Laster, Blythe Kanis,
Simone Ilg di Pietro Reche, and of course, to Eva and Marisol Encinias –– for the abundance they’ve shared
with me. Thank you to the National Institute of Flamenco, who has generously supported me as I pursue this
degree, and to my father and mentor, Joaquin Encinias, for his ongoing artistic guidance and care. Finally, I
would like to give all of my thanks to God, who hears my prayers, for each day’s unexpected salvation.
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SENSACIONES y EMOCIONES studies the role of emotion and sensation in shaping a dance. In this
performance, I wonder if my feelings exist mainly in my thoughts, in my body, in the music I hear, or some
combination of those places. I wonder if feelings are free to travel in space and time on their own somehow,
and I wonder how I might help them to be free. I wonder what is happening –– emotionally speaking –– when
a body is moved to dance.
I began this work by asking myself how I might newly understand the idea and experience of self-expression,
and then, by investigating other directions and ways in which to move with feeling –– as a dancer, as a
performer, as a student of flamenco. In this study, I have been deeply humbled by the incredible music in this
concert, and all the feeling that is there. My hope tonight is to stand close-by the feelings for an hour: to use
them to get closer to you, to surrender to them, and then to follow them, just as they start disappearing.
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